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THE LA WYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER: ETHICS 
FOR A NEW PRACTICE 
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW· 
What ... promotes or impedes good work today? ... [Glood work-work 
of expert quality that benefits the broader society ... , 
HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCEllENCE AND ETHICS MEET, at 
xi (2001). 
Cooperation-the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force behind 
our evolving capacity for language, the glue of our social cohesion. . . . 
Selfishness is also written on our hearts. This is our mammalian conflict: 
what to give to the others and what to keep for yourself. Treading that line, 
keeping the others in check and being kept in check by them, is what we call 
morality. 
IAN MCEWAN, ENDURING LOVE i 5 (i 997). I 
I. INTRODUCTION: ETHICS AND CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE 
LA WYER' S ROLE 
The traditional role ofa lawyer is to represent a client's partisan interest. 
The first few iterations of ethical rules for lawyers mainly recognized the 
lawyer's role as a representative in a litigation setting.2 More recently, 
• Professor of Law and Director, Georgetown-Hewlett Program on Conflict Resolution 
and Legal Problem Solving, Georgetown University Law Center. This article draws on several 
presentations made while visiting The University of Tennessee as Distinguished Visiting 
Professor in Advocacy and Dispute Resolution in March 2002. I would like to thank The 
University of Tennessee faculty for its hospitality, and I would like to give a special thanks to 
myoid friend and colleague Dean Rivkin for stimulating conversations on this and other topics. 
1. The first chapter of this novel recounts the attempted rescue by several individuals of 
two passengers in a falling hot air balloon. The rescuers' decisions to hold on or let go of the 
hot air baUoon demonstrate the tensions of the "prisoner's dilemma," which involve deciding 
whether to cooperate or defect in the absence of any communication among the parties. See 
A V1NASHDIXIT & SUSAN SKEA TH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 225-87 (1999); WILUAMPOUNDSTONE, 
PRISONER'S DILEMMA 216 (1992) (stating that in the prisoner's dilemma, "the common good 
is subverted by individual rationality," where "[ e lach player desires the other's cooperation, yet 
is tempted to defect himself'). 
2. In 1908, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), at the time an exclusive professional 
association, adopted the original Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons"). MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT preface, at vii (2002). The Canons were based on the pioneering work of 
Judge George Sharswood, whose work was published in 1854, and David Hoffinan, whose work 
was published in 1836 as originally codified in the Code of Ethics "adopted by the Alabama Bar 
Association in 1887." [d. Between 1913 and 1964, a number of ABA cornriUttees were charged 
63 
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ethical codes for lawyers have recognized alternative roles that lawyers 
conduct issues, and dealing with grievances. Id. In 1964, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
created a special committee to assess the ethical standards of the profession. /d. The 
committee's work resulted in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), 
which was adopted by the ABA in 1969 and then adopted by a "majority of state and federal 
jurisdictions." Id. In 1977, the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards entirely 
revamped the Model Code into its current form-the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
("Model Rules"). Id. at vii-viii. The Model Rules omitted the three levels of canons, 
disciplinary rules, and ethical considerations and included only simplified blackletter rules and 
comments, which merely explained the Model Rules and advised readers of other substantive 
laws or principles that might affect the professional conduct oflawyers. Robert W. Meserve, 
Introduction, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT at xi (2002). 
For many years, about half of the states operated under the Model Code and the other half 
operated under the Model Rules. California, however, has yet to adopt the Model Rules or the 
Model Code; instead, it has drafted its own regulations, which are found in the California 
Business and Professions Code and the California Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1997, the 
ABA established the Ethics 2000 Commission, to address a variety of important and new issues, 
such as modem communication technologies, class action law suits, and ADR. Id. preface, at 
viii. The Ethics 2000 Commission, however, only submitted proposals for relatively minor 
amendments to the Model Rules and, for the most part, avoided dealing with such questions 
concerning multi-disciplinary practice, class actions, ADR, and many modem technological 
issues. Where the Ethics 2000 Commission took a relatively bold stand (following the 
American Law Institute's similar treatment in section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers), in proposing to permit lawyers to disclose confidential client information 
to "prevent, mitigate or rectify" serious economic injury, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Proposed Official Draft 2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleI6.html(last visited Oct. 3.1, 2002), the ABA House of 
Delegates rejected the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposal when it approved the amendments 
to the Model Rules in February 2002. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleI6.html(last visited Oct. 31, 2002); ABA 
Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Comm'n, at http://www.abanet. 
orglcpr/e2k-report _home.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). 
The Ethics 2000 Commission's treatment of disclosure of economic fraud is further 
complicated by the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of II V.S.C.A., 18 V.S.C.A., 28 
V.S.C.A., and 29 V.S.C.A.), which requires lawyers to report corporate fraud to corporate 
officials, board members, and others. Id. at 784. The states and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission will now regulate disclosure of economic fraud, and thus, federal and state law may 
differ from the ABA's official position in the Model Rules. It is important to remember that the 
Model Rules do not have the force of positive law unless enacted by a state's legislature or 
supreme court, which has regulatory power over that state's legal profession. However, the 
Model Rules and the advisory opinions issued by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional 
Responsibility, although not law, are widely influential because most states have formally 
adopted most of the Model Rules with a series of variations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 reporter's note (2000) (reviewing state departures from the 
Model Rules). It remains to be seen whether the formulations and blackletter rules of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers will displace the Model Rules as states now 
begin another round of review of ethics rules and regulations. 
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perfonn as counselors,3 lobbyists,4 and government lawyers.s Such 
recognition of alternative roles, however, assumes that lawyers will continue 
to serve as zealous advocates for their clients. In general, a lawyer's duty is 
conceived of as a duty to maximize a client's individual, corporate, or entity 
interest within the bounds of the law. 6 Thus, although there are some limits 
placed on the "zealous advocate,"7 the lawyer's goal is to seek gains that 
benefit his client-whether those gains are achieved by "winning" in litigation 
or by drafting advantageous clauses in contracts. 
In the last few decades, the American Bar Association ("ABA") has 
revised the ethical rules for lawyers several times, beginning with the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") in 1969, continuing with 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983,8 and, most 
recently, with the proposed revisions to the Model Rules by the Ethics 2000 
Commission.9 With each revision, debates emerge regarding the introduction 
of new duties and responsibilities for lawyers who serve in alternative roles 
of legal practice. 1O Despite the ABA's efforts, arguments continue regarding 
whether it is possible to draft an ethical code for a unitary legal profession and 
whether specialized codes are required to recognize the distinct duties that 
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1,2.3-2.4 (2002) (stating that a 
lawyer may advise a client on "moral, economic, social[,] and political" considerations, provide 
a third party with "an evaluation of a matter affecting a client" if "compatible with ... the 
lawyer's relationship with the client[,]" and serve as a third-party neutral for "two or more 
persons who are not" the lawyer's clients). 
4. See, e.g., id. R. 3.9 (discussing the procedures a lawyer must follow when 
"representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonajudicative 
proceeding"). 
5. See, e.g., id. R. 3.8 (discussing the particular ethical responsibilities of prosecutors 
in criminal cases). 
6. See WILUAMSIMON, lHEPRACTICEOFJUSTICE: A lHEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS 7-8 
(1998). 
7. Compare MODEL CODE OFPROF'LREsPONSffiIUTY Canon 7 (1980) (including zealous 
representation in the black letter rule), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT pmbl., 8 & R. 
1.3 cmt. [I] (2002) (discussing zealous advocacy only in the preamble and in comment 
sections). Despite such textual revisions, most lawyers continue to claim that their duty is to 
zealously protect and advocate for their clients. Thus, the culture of ethics may not entirely 
coincide with the letter of the law or the rules. 
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface, at vii-viii (2002). 
9. To view the full text of the Model Rules, as approved by the House of Delegates in 
February 2002, and the Model Rules, as proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission, see ABA 
Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Comm'n, at http://www.abanet. 
orglcpr/e2k-report _ home.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002). 
10. Despite drafting rules that recognize lawyers as third-party neutrals, the Ethics 2000 
Commission considered, yet declined, to draft ethical rules for lawyers representing clients in 
class action lawsuits. See Nancy Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, U. IlL 
L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). Bankruptcy lawyers also unsuccessfully lobbied for special ethical 
rules for their specialized practice. 
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flow from alternative fonns of legal practice. II Increasingly, private 
professional associations, federal agencies,12 state agencies, and other bodies 
have begun to regulate lawyer conduct. 
In this Article, I explore the roles of lawyers in alternative dispute 
resolution C"ADR"), including traditional roles in arbitration and "new" roles 
in mediation and facilitation. I also discuss how conventional ethics rules for 
lawyers fail to provide guidance and "best practices" for lawyers who serve 
in these new roles. State legislatures and professional associations, such as 
the American Arbitration Association C"AAA"), the Center for Public 
Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution ("CPR"), and the Association of 
Conflict Resolution, have adopted ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators. 
Select professional associations are also developing "best practice" guides for 
the provision of ADR services; however, the lack of clarity in the Model 
Rules is a serious problem. The failure of the Model Rules to recognize the 
role oflawyers in "peacemaking," dispute prevention or resolution, and legal 
problem solving marks an absence in what is publicly recognized as among 
thernost important roles a lawyer performs-that ofa "constructive lawyer."13 
Furthennore, the Model Rules misrepresent the legal profession by assuming 
that representing clients in adversarial matters is the only role lawyers fulfill. 14 
II. See. e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When 
the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CoRNELLL. REv. 1159, 1161 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts J ("We probably need to recraft some of our ethics rules 
(conflicts of interests, attorney-client relations, and attorneys' fees) to take account of new forms 
of action and representation. "). 
12. Congress recently passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 
307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28 
U.S.C.A., and 29 U.S.C.A.), which requires lawyers to "whistle blow" or disclose "evidence of 
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the" 
corporation "to the chief legal counselor chief executive officer" and to certain board 
committees if the counselor officer does not appropriately respond. [d. 116 Stat. at 784; see 
also Stephanie Francis Cahill, Corporate-Fraud Law Forces Lawyers to be Whistle-Blowers, 
I A.B.A. J. EREp., Aug. 2, 2002, at, I, available at WL 29 ABAJEREP I [hereinafter Cahill, 
Corporate Fraud Law] (''The corporate responsibility law ... requires in-house and outside 
lawyers to report evidence of corporate wrongdoing to their client companies' boards of 
directors. "). Such a rule is contrary to the dictates oflawyer-client confidentiality in the Model 
Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). The original Ethics 2000 
Commission proposal to require lawyers to report economic fraud was defeated in the House 
of Delegates in February 2002. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Task Force Has Take On 
Lawyers' Responsibility, I A.B.A. J. EREp., Aug. 2, 2002, at" 4, 7, available at WL 29 
ABAJEREP2. 
13. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: 
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 786 (1999) (quoting 
Professor Vicki Jackson, Remarks at the Meeting of CPR Comm'n on Problem-Solving in Legal 
Educ., at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Oct. 22, 1999» [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The 
Lawyer as Problem Solver). 
14. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodem. 
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Such an assumption fails to give adequate guidance to a lawyer who fulfills 
a broader, and perhaps, more significant role than that of a "hired gun."ts 
As we debate the basic elements of human nature-whether humans are 
intrinsically competitive or cooperative l6-sirnilar debates also arise regarding 
the legal profession. Do lawyers engage in unnecessary adversarial conflicts 
or, in the alternative, do lawyers contribute to society by negotiating 
agreements, 17 creating new entities and concepts,18 seeking justice, resolving 
disputes, and facilitating policy initiatives?19 If lawyers are capable of 
performing new roles, what incentives, rules, and regulations should govern 
their behavior? 
n. NEW ROLES FOR LA WYERS: DISPUTE RESOLVERS, THIRD-PARTY 
NEUTRALS, AND FACILITATORS 
In his novel Enduring Love, Ian McEwan eloquently expresses the 
dilemma of cooperation versus selfishness.2o The protagonist, a science writer 
named Joe Rose, is picnicking in a field when he sees a hot air baBoon with 
a passenger dangling from a rope.21 Sensing his "cooperative," life-
preserving, and altruistic instincts, Rose rushes into the field to try to help the 
passenger.22 Four other men respond similarly and run from each comer of 
the field.23 The men manage to grab the lines, but the wind catches the 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5,24 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The 
Trouble with the Advocacy System). 
15. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, Enncs FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORAUTY OF ROLES 
IN PUBUC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 108 (1999) (analyzing the profession of law and the 
adversarial role oflawyers as a core animating principle). 
16. See, e.g., ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION preface, at ix-x 
(1984); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 12 (1976); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF 
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERA nON 6-7 (1996) ("Society ... 
evolved as part of our nature. . .. [W]e must look inside our brains at the instinct for creating 
and exploiting social bonds .... We must also look at other animals to see how the essentially 
competitive business of evolution can sometimes give rise to cooperative instincts. "). See 
generally ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND 
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998) (exploring sources of altruism and the effects of 
altruism as a motivational force). 
17. See ROBERT H. MNOOKINET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE V AWE 
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES, at ix (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: 
Business Lawyers and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1,7-8 (1995). 
18. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving 
and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 97, 124-25 (2001). 
19. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEAOOW, 1HE LAWYERS' ROLE(S) IN DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 16·23 (2000) (unpUblished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee Law Review). 
20. See McEWAN, supra introductory quote. 
21. Id. at 9. 
22. Id. at 10. 
23. Id. 
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balloon and pushes it Up.24 As they coast upward, the roar of the wind 
prevents the men from communicating with each other about what to do 
next.2S This is the "prisoner's dilemma," but the situation the characters face 
is not a game. Several lives hang in the balance, and each rescuer must decide 
whether to hold on or let go as the balloon veers toward an escarpment, which 
drops off a considerable distance, making a safe, controlled landing less 
possible.26 With the force of nature and chance (the wind), combined with 
unorganized human behavior, itself derived from conflicting motives of 
altruistic rescue and self-interested survival, what can be done? It is not clear 
who "defects" first; however, all but one of the five rescuers drop the line so 
as to land safely before the balloon is carried over the cliff and tragedy 
ensues.27 In the aftermath, the protagonist Rose considers a variety of 
important philosophical questions about the nature of man and his efforts to 
coordinate human activity. Rose concludes that 
[t]here may have been a vague commonality of purpose, but we were never 
a team. . . . Any leader, any firm plan, would have been preferable to none. 
No human society, from the hunter-gatherer to the post-industrial, has come 
to the attention of anthropologists that did not have its leaders and the led; 
and no emergency was ever dealt with effectively by democratic process .. 
.. What is certain is that if we had not broken ranks, our collective weight 
would have brought the balloon to earth a quarter of the way down the slope 
as the gust subsided a few seconds later. . .. [T]here was no team, there was 
no plan, no agreement to be broken.28 
Rose contemplates the nature of man and finds it in need of coordination in 
order to be a good society-"one that makes sense of being good.,,29 
Much like the participants in a prisoner's dilemma situation, parties 
involved in real human conflicts cannot reach an outcome favorable to all 
without communication and coordination; though some outcome will result 
in the absence of communication (as in the Enduring Love example), that 
outcome may ignore, disregard, or contravene the interests of one or more of 
the parties.30 A facilitator is required to coordinate activities and to facilitate 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 14. 
27. Id.atI4-17. 
28. Id. at 11,14-15. 
29. Id. at 15. 
30. Most game theory assumes that no coordination occurs and assumes that individuals 
seek "solutions" in strategies that make assumptions about how the others will also attempt to 
maximize their gains. John Nash's Nobel Prize-winning work, based on his "Nash equilibrium" 
solution, explained how actors should behave in multi-party, simultaneous action, and in non-
cooperative games. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note I, at 82, 213-16 (stating that application 
in real life suggests that actors seek some "pay-offs" in reciprocity and reputation in repeated 
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problem solving and communication, especially in emergency settings.31 
A modem philosopher has recently reached similar conclusions after a 
lifetime of studying the elements of a good society. In his recent book, Justice 
is Conjlict,32 Stuart Hampshire suggests that humans are unlikely to agree on 
the elements of the "good life" and are more likely to hold conflicting values 
due to the increasingly diverse world; therefore, we may only reach a 
consensus regarding fair procedures for resolving disagreements. 33 Aud~ 
alteram partem, which means to "hear the other side,"34 is the one principle 
that may unite us. We, as lawyers, must learn to hear ourselves as well as 
others and to reason in a balanced manner as the adversarial system requires. 
Procedures can create justice and fairness, and the procedures of conflict 
resolution are our only hope for survival in a world where we are unlikely to 
agree on our ultimate aims. Hampshire suggests that "the skillful management 
of conflict [is] among the highest of human skills.,,3s Although Hampshire 
rests his procedural justice claim on a conventional view of adversarial 
justice, citing such familiar examples as trials, arbitration, and negotiation, he 
argues t..'1at developing institutions that promote procedural fairness should be 
the first priority of lawyers, especially where "the human race is unlikely to 
survive for very long unless reasonably fair procedures develop and become 
accepted for negotiations and arbitrations in the settling of international 
conflicts threatening war. ,,36 
For at least two decades, creating institutions and procedures that are 
capable of providing fair processes, where all sides may be heard, has been the 
goal of political scientists, public-policy practitioners, and conflict-resolution 
theorists and practitioners at both the international and domestic levels.37 
games so that "fair and nice" behavior can be a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game); see also 
AxELROD, supra note 17, at 118-20 ("[I]t is good advice to ... reciprocate defection as well as 
cooperation."). The movie, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (DreamWorks Pictures 2001), provides a 
simplified illustration of how individuals maximize joint and individual gain by declining to 
seek the same scarce resource, a single blonde, and choosing instead the next best resource, a 
group of brunettes. [d. For a historical description of John Nash and his work, see SYLVIA 
NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998). 
3 \. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 222-23 (1999) 
(describing the importance of communicating intent to team members to facilitate independence, 
problem solving, and coordination of activities). 
32. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000). 
33. [d. at 79. 
34. [d. at 8-11. 
35. [d. at 35. 
36. [d. at 40. 
37. See, e.g., JACOB BERCOVITCH & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 13 (1992) (stating that "international, transnational, and other non-state actors .. 
.. [ are] very active participants in the search for institutions and proposals conducive to peace," 
and that it is expected that "such organizations [will] play their full part in the mediation of 
international disputes"); ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
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Building on the work of social philosopher Jiirgen Habennas, who argued for 
"ideal speech conditions,,38 where democratic discourse may be employed to 
resolve conflict, American theorists and practitioners have elaborated on the 
practice of "deliberative democracy,,39 and "democratic discourse.,,40 The 
goal of deliberative democracy and democratic discourse is to allow for 
greater participation by individuals most affected by policy issues or conflict 
resolution. In the words ofHabennas, a "moral norm is valid only insofar as 
it wins assent of the people concerned. ,,41 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 40 (2d ed. 1991) ("The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in 
conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and 
fears. "); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUilDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCIUA TION IN DNIDED 
SOCIETIES 24 (J 997) (''To be at all germane to contemporary conflict, peacebuilding must be 
rooted in and responsive to the experimental and subjective realities shaping people's 
perspectives and needs."); DEAN G. PRUITT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: 
ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 140 (1986) ("It is often possible to engage in 
problem solving and at the same time cope directly with these risks [such as one party 
benefitting more from problem solving] by ... communicating covertly with the other party, 
combining problem solving with contentious behavior, equalizing the parties in verbal ability, 
or paying greater attention to the needs of the party with greater threat capacity .... "). See 
generally MARC HOWARD Ross, lHE CULTUREOFCONFUCT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993) (exploring conflict management in intergroup and cross-
cultural relations); HAROLD SAUNDERS, A PUBUC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO 
TRANSFORM RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLlCTS (1999) (describing a process by which disputants 
in significant international and domestic ethnic conflicts can move toward more peaceful 
relations through "sustained dialogues"). 
38. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE lHEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 22 (William Rehg trans., 1996); JORGEN 
HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 3-15, 116-23 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1979); I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: 
REASON AND THE RATIONAUZATION OF SOCIETY 30?-07 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). 
39. See JAMES BOHMAN, PUBllC DELIBERATION: PLURAllSM, COMPLEXITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1996); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DEliBERATION: NEWDlRECTIONS 
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 35-37 (1991). Seegenera/ly AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT ( 1996) (exploring compromise in a system of representative 
government); DELIBERATIVE POUTICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 1999) (questioning in a series of essays the conventional wisdom of deliberative 
democracy). 
40. See generally MARK KINGWELL, A ClVlL TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE, AND THE 
POUTICS OF PLURALISM (1995) (discussing justice and communicative action); cf FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, TALKING AS DECISION PROCEDURE, lHE GoOD SOCIETY (1999) (criticizing 
deliberative democracy literature as focused on "process" cures, rather than on substantive value 
conflicts). 
41. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DEliBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 110 
(1996); see also JORGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical 
Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43-115 (Christian 
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1990). 
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Application of modem political and conflict resolution theories42 to legal 
and policy disputes encouraged the redevelopment and reorientation of 
conventional ADR procedures, such as mediation and arbitration,43 and 
prompted the development of new forms of ADR, such as "consensus 
building"44 and participatory pUblic-policy fora.4s Whether they are 
attempting to resolve traditional legal disputes through facilitated negotiation 
(mediation), private adjudication (arbitration), or as facilitors of public policy 
fora, lawyers use their legallmowledge and expertise and act as neutrals, not 
as partisan representatives, as contemplated by the Model Rules. When the 
purpose of the lawyer's work is to facilitate an agreement that is acceptable 
to all parties rather than to attempt to maximize the individual client's interest, 
conventional lawyer ethics rules have scant relevance. 
Lawyers who serve in neutral roles share responsibilities with non-
lawyers who are professionals and non-professionals.46 While some worry 
that rigorous ethical rules, which only apply to lawyers who serve in neutral 
roles, will place lawyers at a disadvantage, I argue that higher standards wiIl 
42. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, THE HANDBOOK OF CONFUCT RESOLUTION: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (exploring developing theories 
in social and cognitive psychology and sociology for application to conflict resolution practice); 
MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE 
PROCESSES 151 (I 973)(stating that 
[t]here are two basic modes of intrapsychic conflict resolution. First is the tendency to 
change the external reality so that the conflict between the behavioral tendencies no longer 
exists; the other is to change the cognitions and/or valences that determine the direction 
and potency of the conflicting behavioral tendencies). 
43. For my argument that recent conflict-resolution theory and practice in law and legal 
studies originated with the work of the Legal Process school of the 1950s, most notably the 
work of Lon Fuller, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The 
Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. RESOL. I (2000). See also Lon L. Fuller, 
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1971) (discussing the theory and 
methodology of mediation). 
44. See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et aJ. eds., 1999) (discussing the process, 
application, and success of consensus building). 
45. See, e.g., SUSAN CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBUC DISPUTES 
(2001). 
46. Very few states regulate the provision of intermediation services. Thus, virtually 
anyone may claim to be a mediator or facilitator. Some states, like Florida, regulate the 
conditions under which someone may mediate in a court program. See, e.g., FLA. R. elY. P. 
10.1 00(b )(2) (West 2000) (stating that, among other requirements, a family mediator must 
have a master's degree or doctorate in social work, mental health, or behavioral or social 
sciences; be a physician certified to practice adult or child psychiatry; or be an attorney 
or a certified public accountant licensed to practice in any United States jurisdiction; and 
.have at least 4 years practical experience in one of the aforementioned fields or have 8 
years family mediation experience with a minimum of 10 mediations per year). 
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make lawyers more appealing.47 Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first 
to note that, at least in the United States, lawyers might be particularly well-
suited to participate in the intennediation of class, policy, and partisan 
interests because, in a democratic society that does not have an aristocracy or 
monarchy, "[lawyers] serve as arbiters between the citizens."48 
Why might lawyers be particularly well-suited to serve as the citizens' 
arbiters or dispute resolvers? What may lawyers do to resolve social, 
economic, and political problems beyond fonnal adversarial client 
representation? Elsewhere, I defined a lawyer as 
a professional with fonnallegal training who employs law, as well as other 
relevant disciplines [and skills], to solve human problems and disputes, plan 
transactions, prepare legal instruments and regulations, and who facilitates 
and engages in processes designed to accomplish compliance with law and 
the pursuit of justice as members of society seek to accomplish legitimate 
aims of individual and sociallife.49 
Anthony Kronrnan suggests that lawyers have a special place in the 
intermediation of private interests, public values, and institutions because of 
their dual loyalty to clients and to the polity in which they serve as officers of 
justice, if not narrowly, the courts. Kronman says that 
[l]awyers serve private interests of their clients but they also care about 
integrity and justice of the legal system that defmes public order within 
which these interests are pursued. In this way, they provide a link between 
the realms of public and private life, helping to rejoin what the forces of 
privatization are constantly pulling apart. so 
Lawyers, then, may serve as mediators of the social order, helping to achieve 
the bargained for, principled,S I and creativeS2 arrangements that cultivate 
47. Consider how fickle the public is about trusting professions. After many years of 
documented distrust of lawyers, see Michael Asimow, Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in the 
Movies, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1339, 1372 (2001) ("Recent Harris Polls have found that public 
attitudes to lawyers and law firms, which were already low, continue to get worse. Lawyers 
have seen a dramatic decline in their 'prestige' which has fallen faster than that of any other 
occupation, over the last twenty years." (quoting The Harris Poll # 37 (Aug. II, 1997))), 
lawyers are now seen as possible saviors of the public in litigation against auditors and 
corporate executives in the wake of recent corporate audit scandals. 
48. ALExIs DE TOCQUEVll.LE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966). 
49. Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as a Problem Solver, supra note 13, at 793-94 
(emphasis omitted). 
50. Anthony Kronman, The Law as a ProfeSSion, in Enncs IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' 
ROLES, RESPONSlBIUTIES, AND REGULATION 29,36 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). 
51. See Jon Elster, Strategic Use of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFUCT RESOLUTION 
239 (Kenneth 1. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (giving an elegant description and contrast of 
HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 73 2002-2003
2002] THE LA WYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER 73 
peaceful co-existence, social hannony, social justice, and Pareto-optimality. 53 
Modem legal disputes, in both the public and private realm, often involve 
multiple parties and issues and take many different fonns. Beyond the 
traditional civil or criminal trials, contemporary legal disputes include ADR 
procedures, such as private mediation, arbitration, hybrids of mediation and 
arbitration, such as mediation-arbitration ("med-arb") and mini-trials,54 and 
court-recommended procedures, such as settlement conferences, arbitration, 
mediation, and summary jury and judge trials. In addition to these better 
known examples of "alternative" (we now say "appropriate") dispute 
resolution, newer forms of ADR, such as facilitated policy dialogue, 
consensus building, and multi-track negotiation and diplomacy are gaining 
popularity in the resolution of lawsuits, public policy issues, budget and 
resource allocation, and environmental, local community, and international 
disputes. In all of these processes, a "neutral," rather than a partisan, guides 
the process by serving as a mediator or conciliator in facilitating negotiation 
between the parties, as an arbitrator in deciding legal or factual issues for the 
parties, or as a facilitator in "help[ing] a group of individuals or parties with 
divergent views reach a goal or complete a task to the mutual satisfaction of 
the participants. "55 Legal training provides special expertise and opportunities 
for these functions to be performed by a law-trained person; however, legal 
education does not necessarily train lawyers for alternative roles,56 and 
conventional ethics rules do not provide guidance for good practices. 
To the extent that third-party interveners derive their power and authority 
from "their status, legitimacy, process-management skills, and 
persuasiveness,,,5'lawyers may be especially suited to perform a wide range 
ofthird-party neutral roles, particularly when legal issues arise. In its simplest 
bargaining and reasoning in the political processes that lead to political agreements, even in 
such important matters as constitution-making). 
52. See Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible?, supra note 18. 
53. See HOWARDRAlFFA, THE ART ANDSCIENCEOFNEGOTlATION 139 (1982)(discussing 
Pareto-optimality-the condition where parties can no longer improve their individual positions 
without causing harm to the other parties). 
54. See The ABC's of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH 
COST LITIG. 14 (1995). 
55. DICTIONARY OFCONFUCT RESOLUTION 177 (Douglas H. Yam ed., 1999) (defining 
"facilitator"). 
56. See. e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A 
Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL Eouc. 14 (1999) (discussing the process in 
which law schools may educate law students in problem-solving techniques); Janet Reno, 
Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL Eouc. 5, 5-6 (1999) 
(urging law schools to incorporate "problem solving" into the core curriculum of legal 
education). 
57. MICHAEL WATKINS, BREAKTHROUGH BUSINESS NEGOTIATION: A TOOLBOX FOR 
MANAGERS, ch. 7 (2002), reprinted in Michael Watkins, Third Party Dilemmas: Are the 
Neutrals Workingfor Themselves? 20 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 199 (2002). 
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fonn, a lawyer serving as a third-party neutral acts as a mediator between two 
or more disputing parties by facilitating negotiations without deciding 
anything for the parties. 58 Mediators do not represent the parties who appear 
before them. For that reason, among others, Rule 2.2 of the old version of the 
Model Rules, which permitted a lawyer to serve as an "intennediary" and 
engage in joint representation of clients, has been dropped from the revised 
version of the Model Rules.59 Because lawyers who serve as mediators do not 
represent parties, the conventional ethical rules, which depend on the 
representational relationship, cannot provide ethical guidelines. Mediation 
presents complex challenges for conventional ethics rules in matters such as 
confidentiality, particularly when parties speak directly with one another. 
Parties do not always speak only in the presence of their lawyers; therefore, 
they may vitiate the lawyer-client privilege of confidentiality. Furthennore, 
the mediator often offers a fonn of confidentiality that applies as between the 
parties against the rest of the world and a fonn of confidentiality that applies 
separately to each party in private caucus sessions. What duty of candor 
should lawyers, parties, and mediators owe one another when Rule 3.3 does 
not apply?60 As mediators work to effectuate their "magic"61 in facilitating 
agreements, they confront issues regarding confidentiality, competence, fees, 
conflicts of interests, whether they are practicing law in counseling, advising, 
or drafting agreements,62 and whether they owe any duties to third parties.63 
58. There is a spirited debate among mediators about the differences between facilitated 
mediation and mediation that is more "evaluative." See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. 
Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LmG. 31 (1996) 
(arguing that to remain "pure," mediators should "facilitate" but never "evaluate" the merits of 
arguments, positions, or case quality (legality) of disputants in a mediation). Even in evaluative 
mediation the mediator may evaluate the parties' arguments or claims and give them "reality 
testing" about their respective positions. The parties, however, must still formulate a negotiated 
agreement. 
59. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002) (eliminating the intermediary 
rule found in the old Rule 2.2), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2001) 
(permitting a lawyer to serve as an intermediary in limited circumstances). The former Rule 2.2 
was loosely based on the practice of Louis Brandeis, who served as an intermediary in a 
bankruptcy case and whose practice was described by others as "counsel for the situation." See 
Clyde Spill enger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, I 05 YALE 
L.J.I44S, 1502-04 & 1502 n.194 (1996). This artful formulation ofa lawyer's potential role 
is difficult to manage in practice, especially given the strong conflict of interest standards that 
are still the hallmark of our adversarial system. 
60. The Model Rules and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers define 
many duties as applying only to lawyers who appear before tribunals, which include lawyers in 
binding arbitration but not in mediation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0, 3.3 
(2002); REsTATEMENT (lHIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. a (1998). 
61. See, e.g.,John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LoY. U.CHI.L.J. 
I, 4-6 ( 1997) (discussing deception, its various forms, and whether it is an "acceptable or 
unacceptable [form) of persuasion in mediation"). 
62. See Carrie Menke\-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES 
HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 2002-2003
2002] THE LAWYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER 75 
The most familiar third-party neutral role is that of the arbitrator. An 
arbitrator decides matters involving fact, law, or a combination of both fact 
and law and whether to enforce contracts, such as in labor or commercial 
disputes. Although conducted in private with privately adopted rules of 
procedure, evidence, and decision, the role of arbitrator is much like that of 
judge with rules of conduct prescribed by the parties by their constitutive 
contract or by the appointing arbitral institution.64 Even the Model Rules6s 
and many state statutes66 have formerly recognized and prescribed some 
guidance for the role of arbitrator. 
Perhaps least familiar to most readers and central to my claims about the 
new roles of lawyers as consensus builders is the role of lawyers as neutral 
facilitators in consensus building or in the public-policy participatory fora. 
These processes, which involve multiple and complex issues with more than 
two parties, are hybrids of negotiation, case presentation, and often, 
legislation and rule-drafting. As a result, such processes require skilled 
facilitation and meeting management skills. Such innovative processes derive 
their power from their ability to attract multiple stakeholders to the table to 
debate policy issues, values, facts, and legal issues and disputes and when 
TO HIGH COST LmG. 57 (1996); Bruce Myerson, Lawyers who Mediate are not Practicing Law, 
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74 (1996). 
63. The Model Rules do not tackle such complex issues of mediator ethics; however, 
mediator ethics are handled in a variety of special ethical codes. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS 
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Prof Is in 
Dispute Resolution 1994) (specifically discussing in Principle III conflicts of interest for 
mediators); CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics & Standards In ADR, Proposed Model Rule 
ofProrl Conduct Rule 4.5 for The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral R. 4.5.3(a)(2) (Final Draft 
2002), at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter CPR-Georgetown 
Proposed Rule 4.5] ("A lawyer serving in a third party neutral capacity should not allow other 
matters to interfere with the lawyer's impartiality."). Increasingly, private professional 
associations and states are developing ethical rules for mediators. See, e.g., TENN. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (effective Mar. I, 2003) (prescribing the duties of lawyers who serve 
as dispute-resolution neutrals). 
64. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute 
Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949, 958-61 
(2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration]. 
65. Both the new and old versions of Rule 1.12 address conflicts of interest when one 
member of a law firm acts as an arbitrator and the lawyer's partners seek to subsequently 
represent one of the parties to the arbitration, usually in an unrelated matter. Compare MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.\ 2 (2002), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12 
(2001). Rule 1.12 has incorporated tile American (non-international) understanding of the 
"partisan" arbitrator in three person arbitration panels, allowing the arbitrator, who is chosen 
by the parties, to continue in a representational capacity for that party. Id. 
66. Some states include arbitration in judicial codes of conduct because of the 
adjudicatory function of arbitrators. More recently, however, some states have begun to 
regulate the ethical obligations of arbitrators separately. See, e.g., CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS FOR 
NEUTRAl.. ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION (Cal. Judicial Council 2002). 
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successful, from their ability to reach a resolution that is often otherwise 
impossible in more formal legal settings where party politics or adversarialism 
often reduce the issues to binary and hotly contested alternatives. In the 
regulatory setting, such mixed processes are used to develop regulatory 
negotiations ("reg-neg" or negotiated rule-making)67 to assist participants in 
arriving at agreements on environmental siting and clean-up plans, to 
accommodate preservationist and development interests, to resolve ethnic, 
community, and international disputes, and to develop budget allocations, as 
well as future financial and strategic plans. When multiple levels of 
government are involved in handling regulatory issues and other problems, 
new forms of coordination, experimentation, and administrative practices 
draw on the processes of stakeholder negotiation, facilitated and contingent 
agreements, and party-negotiated plans and solutions. In our domain oflaw, 
these practices have been labeled "democratic or constitutional 
experimentalism,>68 because they challenge conventional notions of separation 
of powers, federalism, and regulation by providing for more democratic 
participation of parties and stakeholders in community problem solving and 
administrative action and regulation. 
At the process level, consensus building is a managed, deliberative, and 
decision-making process in which a third-party neutral is usually hired to 
perform conflict or issue assessment, to map potential interests and 
stakeholders, and to design and implement a process of "convening" 
representatives, groups, and constituencies to deliberate in a structured way 
about how to make decisions (developing both "deliberation" or process rules 
and decision rules) and what decisions to make. Structured discourse usually 
requires the development of ground rules, which are "enforced" by the third-
party conveners or facilitators, usually after adoption, negotiation, and 
acceptance by the participants.69 Participants are often trained in negotiation 
skills before they begin so that a basic skill level is present. 70 Different kinds 
of discourse are allowed and encouraged in such proceedings. While the basic 
justification is a Habermassian71 belief in the power of reasoned argument to 
67. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLAL. REv. 1,33-55 (I 997)(discussingthe negotiated rule-making process); Philip J. Harter, 
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure/or Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1,28-31 (1982) (discussing the 
advantages of "developing rules through negotiation"). 
68. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution 0/ Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (describing theories and examples of 
administrative democracy). 
69. See. e.g., Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert's Rules o/Order for Groups. 
Organizations. and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate By Consensus, in THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 3-5 (discussing Robert's Rules of Order 
as a traditional model and means of enforcing order and decorum in a group setting and 
describing and setting out alternatives thereto). 
70. See id. 
71. See HABERMAS, supra note 41. 
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persuade others of the validity of a particular claim or value choice, other 
fonns of discourse often emerge as well, including bargaining and trading and 
appeals to beliefs, emotions, and so-called "a-rational" justifications72 for 
particular choices that are made. Then rules of decision must be agreed to, 
and, unlike more conventional legal processes of litigation (winllose 
decision), negotiation (bi-Iateral agreement), or legislative action (majority 
voting), these processes often use different decision rules ("consensus," which 
is not necessarily unanimity but stronger than a majority), which require 
different deliberation and voting procedures. 
Frequently, "approved" decisions or policies may still require further and 
fonnal legal approval by the appropriate legal agencies, such as zoning 
boards, administrative agencies, and legislatures; however, with a committed 
set of stakeholders who participated in the process, it is more likely that such 
policy outputs will be accepted.73 Sometimes reaching a decision is not even 
a goal of a process that instead intends to broaden views, to educate 
conflicting parties, or simply to enhance mutual understanding across diverse 
and wide value divides.74 Although such processes intend to encourage 
greater democratic participation by those affected by decisions and policy 
choices,75 the irony is that they still often require some leadership in 
facilitation and action to be effective.76 Regardless, these processes permit 
72. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 
286, 315-17 (1999) [hereinafter ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND] (discussing the traditional 
view that emotions may be to blame for "irrationality" in decision-making); JON ELSTER, 
SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS ON RATIONAUTY 17-26 (1989) 
[hereinafter ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS] (discussing several varieties of irrationality). 
73 . LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & LIORAZION, STRENGTHENING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT EXPERIMENTS 21-30 (Mar. 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee Law Review). 
74. Examples of such wide and diverse value divides are found in the Public 
Conversations Project's dialogues on abortion, gun control, and other highly controversial 
issues. See, e.g., PUBUC CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, CONSTRUCTIVE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
CHALLENGING TIMES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DIALOGUE (2002) (describing procedures for 
conducting a dialogue about a controversial subject with facilitation and ground rules but with 
no decision rules or "action" plans). 
75. See, e.g., ARCHONFUNG,ACCOUNTABLEAUTONOMY: PARTICIPATORYDEUBERATION 
IN URBAN GoVERNANCE (Jan. 2002) (describing community participation and reform projects 
in the Chicago schools and police department) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Tennessee Law Review); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. &SOC'Y 5, 7 (2001) (discussing 
reforms that "aspire to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in 
and influence policies that directly affect their lives"). 
76. It is ironic that I am arguing for both more democratic group participation and 
community participation in governance issues while arguing that a professional class oflawyers 
may be appropriate or necessary to make that democracy work. Ian McEwan's character made 
a similar observation after the would-be rescuers let go of the hot air balloon due to the lack of 
organized action. See McEwAN, supra introductory quote, at 15-17. Lawrence Susskind calls 
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deliberation and action across governmental units and agencies and are 
especially useful for resolving interdisciplinary problems, such as 
environmental problems, which may require the involvement of scientists and 
other experts, as well as community members and professionals. 
Nevertheless, critics argue that these democratic processes subvert and pacify 
more active conflict and political action or that they may be manipulated by 
those with more economic, political, or social power and capital.77 Critics 
also argue that these processes tend to localize and decentralize issues and 
problems that should stay within national policy ambits or in public fora, such 
as courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. Some also claim that 
these new processes are not demonstratively effective; 78 however, most agree 
that it is too early to fully evaluate these innovative forms of action. 79 
At the substantive level, these consensus-building or "empowered 
deliberative democracy"BO practices have been employed in a variety of 
matters, and the catalogues and descriptions of success stories are beginning 
to make their way into print.BI In the legal arena, multi-party, multi-issue 
consensus-building fora have been used for administrative rule-making in 
occupational health and safety and environmental issues,82 environmental 
siting and clean-up disputes (both before and during litigation),83 natural 
this a "professionally facilitated dialogue"; however, he believes that the process would also 
succeed with the leadership of professionals other than lawyers. SUSSKIND & ZION, supra note 
73, at 24-30. 
77. See. e.g., Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. 
THEORY 670, 676-77 (2001) (arguing that the deliberative democratic process is not a good 
recommendation for the ''real world" of politics where there are-many "power disparities" 
among the parties). 
78. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemalcing, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1335 (1997) ("While negotiated rulernaking seeks 
to eliminate conflict, it also adds new sources of conflict and raises unrealistic expectations . 
. . . "). 
79. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y. U. ENVTL L.J. 60, 62 (2000); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The 
Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemalcing, 9 N.Y.V. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000). 
80. Fung & Wright, supra note 75. 
81. See generallyCARMEN SIRIANNI & LEWIS FRIEDlAND, CMc INNovATION IN AMERICA: 
COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT, PUBllC POllCY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR CMC RENEwAL (200 I) 
(cataloguing a variety of examples of collaborative problem-solving processes at a variety of 
civic levels in issues such as the environment, economic development, and public health); THE 
CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44 (discussing the success of consensus building 
in public health, affordable housing, superfund cleanups, and abortion). 
82. See Freeman, supra note 67, at 33 n.84 (discussing consensus building and self-
governance in areas such as the workplace); Harter, supra note 67, at 28-29 (discussing the 
advantages of negotiation over the adversarial process in rule-making in the environmental 
arena). 
83. See.,e.g., Edward Scher, Negotiating Superfund Cleanup at the Massachusetts 
Military Reservation, in THE CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 859-78. 
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resource disputes,84 Indian reservation governance,8S constitution and city 
charter drafting,86 and lawsuit settlements, including major mass tort class 
actions.87 Consensus-building strategies have also been used extensively in 
state and local government policy development for such areas as 
transportation,88 AIDs and health care policy,89 budget and block grant 
allocations, affordable housing,90 and community revitalization and economic 
84. See, e.g., Judith E. Innes & Sarah Connick, San Francisco Estuary Project, in THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 801-27 (discussing the successful use of 
consensus building among "[eJnvironmentalists, agricultural and urban water users, business 
groups, and development interests" in the estuary context); Janet C. Neuman, Run, River, Run: 
Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers Happy-fora Time, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REv. 259 (1996) (discussing mediation between Native Americans, farmers, and others in the 
context of water rights). 
85. See, e.g., Jan Jung-Min Sunoo & Juliette A. Falkner, Regulatory Negotiations: The 
Native American Experience, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 901-
22 (discussing "the largest negotiated rulemaking" process among "Indian tribes and tribal 
organizations" and "federal agencies and offices"). 
86. See, e.g., Kate Connolly, From City Hall to the Streets: A Community Plan Meets the 
Real World, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 969-84 (describing a 
plan to revitalize the city, which involved a "strategy ... built on the idea of partnership 
development, which meant that the ... City Council and the community at large would share 
responsibility for the development and implementation of the plan") (emphasis omitted); Susan 
L. Podziba, The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, 
supra note 44, at 743-72 ("The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, which took place from 
October 1993 through June 1994, was a public consensus building process designed to engage 
a politically disillusioned community in the formation of its new local government. "). 
87. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving the Dalkon 
Shield contraception device); In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 934 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) 
(involving breast implant litigation); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 122 B.R. 6 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving asbestos litigation). 
88. See, e.g., POuey CONSENSUS INITIATNE, NEGOTIATING TRANSPORTATION Pouey 
RULES IN OREGON (2000) (using consensus building processes to develop freeway access 
regulations). 
89. See, e.g., SIRIANNI & FRIEDLAND, supra note 81, at 138-85 (discussing community 
health and "citizen organizing in the health arena"); Michael A. Hughes et aI., Facilitating 
Statewide HIVIAIDS Policies and Priorities in Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1011-29 (describing "a consensus building process for HIV 
prevention strategies in" Colorado); Sarah McKeaman & Patrick Field, The Northern Oxford 
County Coalition: Four Maine Towns Tackle a Public Health Mystery, in THE CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 711-41 ("With leadership from the Maine Department 
of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), town 
residents on different sides ofthe debate came together in 1994 to initiate a community-based 
consensus building process."). 
90. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Susan L. Podziba, Affordable Housing Mediation: 
Building Consensus for Regional Agreements in the Hartford Area, in THE CONSENSUS 
Bun.olNG HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 773-99 ("[AJ 1988 Connecticut state program ... 
initiated a consensus building process to address the housing crisis in the area." Eventually, "a 
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development.91 At less concrete levels of action, such processes have also 
shown promise in "managing," if not resolving, racial, ethnic, and cross-
cultural disputes within particular communities.92 Moreover, at the 
international level, the same techniques have served as the foundations for 
"truth and reconciliation commissions" designed to provide opportunities for 
the expression of injustices so as to promote healing and to facilitate the co-
existence of groups that have engaged in violence and other wrongs against 
one another.93 
Facilitating processes are now used to resolve past "wrongs" and to 
elaborate plans for the future, such as in strategic planning for corporations,94 
organizations, governments, entities, and institutions. Indeed, it is the ability 
to distinguish between punishment for past harms and planning for future 
relationships, as distinct from conventional forms oflitigation and other forms 
of legal action, that is the hallmark of these newer forms of ADR. Dispute 
resolution and prevention services also distinguish "ad hoc" groups and "one-
shot" issues from more permanent, ongoing organizations and relational 
"webs," the latter of which may require different processes, including the 
provision of "system design'>9S services that help organizations develop 
compromise bill passed, creating a pilot program to encourage municipalities, with the help of 
mediators, to negotiate regional affordable housing plans. "). 
91. See, e.g., SIRlANNI & FRIEDLAND, supra note 81, at 35-84 (discussing community 
organizing and development); John Parr, The Chattanooga Process: A City's Vision is 
Realized, in THE CONSENSUS BUIlDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 951-68 ("From recovering 
the river to revitalizing the downtown to creating affordable housing, Chattanooga's list of 
collaboratively solved problems is impressive. "). 
92. See, e.g., Norman Dale, Cross-Cultural Community-Based Planning: Negotiating 
the Future ofHaida Gwaii (British Columbia), in THE CONSENSUS BUIlDING HANDBOOK, supra 
note 45, at 923-50 ("[E]xplicit negotiations have become the most favored means of resolving 
long-standing conflicts between Canada's Native peoples (generally referred to as First Nations) 
and non-Native parties, including governments, other communities, interest groups, and 
industry. "). 
93. See, e.g., SUSAN COllIN MARKS, WATCHING THE WIND: CONFUCT RESOLUTION 
DURING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSmON TO DEMOCRACY 181-82 (2000) (discussing the Peace 
Accord and reconciliation in South Africa); MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFrER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (describing 
South Africa's truth and reconciliation process as one alternative to criminal trials). 
94. See, e.g., Judy Mares-Dixon et aI., BUilding Consensus for Change within a Major 
Corporation: The Case of Levi Strauss & Co., in THE CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra 
note 44, at I 065-86 (discussing Levi Strauss & Co. 's pride in "its consensus-based management 
approach"). The Association of American Law Schools has trained a cadre of law professors 
as facilitators to guide such strategic planning processes in law school planning. 
95. See, e.g., CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY 
ORGANIZATIONS 22-24 (1996) (discussing the recent recognition of the conflict management 
system's effectiveness in organizations); WllllAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOL YEO: 
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CuT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 42 (2d ed. 1993 ) (discussing the "basic 
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internal systems for orderly, participatory dispute processing. 
At the most innovative levels, these processes have been used to facilitate 
"public conversations" about highly controversial matters such as abortion96 
and affirmative action97 where no decisions are made but where political 
discourse is structured to encourage communication and prevent further 
polarization between the parties.98 Although such an approach may not lead 
directly to conflict resolution, it allows for a variety of views to be expressed 
in a pluralistic and democratic society. At the institutional level, these 
processes have been used to develop new and more "permanent" forms of 
decision-making bodies in settings that use the "reg-neg,099 approach in the 
administrative context and "problem-solving courts" in the judicial system. 
"Problem-solving courts" now attempt to "manage" certain legal issues, such 
as family, including such issues as neglect, domestic violence, divorce, and 
custody, with a multi-disciplinary "problem-solving" approach within a single 
court. 100 
Because participation in new processes for legal problem solving places 
lawyers in alternative roles, new forms of training and skills development are 
crucial. As a neutral, the third-party facilitator must know how to maintain 
process neutrality, often in the face of heated debate and value-based 
commitments,IOI know how to develop and then enforce process and ground 
principles of dispute systems design"). 
96. See, e.g., Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on 
Abortion, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1033 (discussing 
consensus processes that were designed to facilitate dialogue "among pro-life and pro-choice 
supporters" in "at least 20 cities"). 
97. For a discussion of "deliberative conversation" on affirmative action, see Menkel-
Meadow, Trouble with the Advocacy System, supra note 14, at 33-38. 
98. See generally DEBORAHT ANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE 
TO DIALOGUE (1998) (discussing how the adversarial system and agonistic arguments have 
dominated law, education,journalism, politics, and American culture and served to polarize and 
simplify subjects that require complex and multi-sided understanding). 
99. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 569-84 (2000) (encouraging negotiated rule-making and addressing 
issues relevant to arbitration proceedings). See also Philip J. Harter & Charles Pou, Jr., Using 
Negotiated Rulemaking Effectively, in FEDERAL AoMINISTRATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
DESKBooK 111-34 (Marshall Breger et al. eds., 2001) ("[T]he 'regulatory negotiation' ... 
recognizes the political nature of the regulatory process and seeks to adopt the philosophy of 
the alternative dispute resolution movement to public policy making."). 
100. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. 
& POL'y 125, 126-27 (2001); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and 
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 V AND. L. REv. 831, 852 (2000); Deborah Epstein, 
Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 28-34 (1999); Judith Kaye, 
Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 851, 862 (1997). 
101. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: 
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 179 (1987) (discussing how a 
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rules for discussion, know how to identify and invite the appropriate 
stakeholders to a particular problem, understand complex negotiation and 
coalition bargaining behaviors and dynamics,102 understand and prevent 
manipulation of voting strategies involved in the development of appropriate 
decision rules, guide and facilitate groups and constituents in their 
deliberations,103 which often entails knowing when to engage in public and 
transparent processes and when to use confidential or "second-track" 
processes, 104 and ultimately, to assist in the development of "imp lemen table," 
"reality-tested" decisions or, at least, "contingent"IOS solutions for particular 
problems. Thus, lawyers who engage in such processes as neutrals will 
require training in meeting management and facilitation. I06 Also important is 
a degree of knowledge regarding the sociology and psychology of group 
behavior,107 as well as economics, political science, the psychology of 
neutral must "switch[] gears" in a zero-sum situation "to introduc[e] the possibility of trading 
things, especially things that the parties value differently"); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK 
FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBliC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING 
DISPUTES 154-55 (1996) (contrasting "interests" and "values"; "[W]hile interests are about what 
we want, values are about what we care about and what we stand for"). 
102. See LEIGH'fiIOMPSON, THE MIND ANDHEARTOFTHE NEGOTIATOR 140-67 (2000); 
Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsol. 
243,245-47 (1994); see, e.g., James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Building Coalitions: With 
Whom Should I Talk First?, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 
(Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996) (stating that "[ s]equencing choices can be a prominent 
feature of coalition building"); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to 
Extremes, 110 YAlE L.J. 71 (2000) (discussing group polarization). 
103. Contrast ROBERT'S RUlES OF ORDER (Sarah Corbin Robert ed., 9th ed. 1990) (1876) 
(containing majority-based decision-making rules), with SUSSKIND & ZION, supra note 73, at 
I, 21 (pointing out that "representative democracy in the United States falls short of our ideals 
in numerous ways" including "excessive reliance on majority rule, and a lack of emphasis on 
forging political consensus"). 
104. "Second-track" or "dual track" negotiation (confidential and secret negotiations) was 
developed in the formal world of international diplomacy; however, second-track negotiation 
is used frequently in legal disputes and in confidential mediation sessions known as caucusing. 
See, e.g., RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFlICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 
2 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996) (analyzing the effectiveness of mediation in the context of 
international dispute management and resolution); WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFlICT (Melanie C. Greenberg et at. eds., 2000). 
105. See, e.g., DAVID LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: 
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 97-98 ( 1986) (discussing the creation 
of contingent agreements). 
106. See JENNIFER E. BEER & EILEEN STIEF, PEACEMAKING IN YoUR NEIGHBORHOOD: 
MODERATOR'S HANDBOOK (1982); TiM HINDLE, MANAGING MEETINGS (1998); ROGER M. 
SCHWARZ, THE SKILlED FACIlITATOR: PRACTICAl WISDOM FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE 
GROUPS (1994). 
107. See, e.g., JOSEPH LUFf, GROUP PROCESSES: AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYNAMICS 
16-35 (1963). 
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strategic voting,108 negotiation,I09 mediation,llo bargaining behaviors, and 
decision science. III 
Lawyers who serve, not as neutrals, but as representatives of parties in 
such processes will also have to learn new skills and bodies of knowledge to 
serve as "representatives" who are not only adversarial advocates, but are also 
wise counselors and problem solvers I12 in processes that call for different 
kinds of participation in creative thinking, communication facilitation, 
coordination with clients and others, and joint problem solving with others. lll 
The role of the lawyer-as-neutral and the lawyer-as-representative in these 
new forms of dispute resolution and policy and transaction formation requires 
different ethical guidelines than those of the traditional adversariallawyer. 
108. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR mE SOCIAL SCIENCES 155-58 (\ 989); 
ELSTER, SOLOMONlC JUDGMENTS, supra note 72, at 85-92 (discussing the advantages ofiottery 
voting, which include "reconcil[ing] honesty with self-interest; reducing the number of wasted 
votes; increasing representation of minority views in elections; and preventing the rise of 
professional politicians"); Thompson, supra note 102, at 154-56 (describing different voting 
strategies). 
109. See, e.g., FISHERET Al.., supra note 37, at 40 (discussing the process and the multiple 
facets of negotiation); MNooKlN ET Al.., supra note 17, at 3 (discussing how "[n]egotiation is 
central to lawyering" and how lawyers can use negotiating skills to "help people construct fair 
and durable commitments, feel protected, recover from loss, and resolve disputes"); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem 
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 764, 795 (1984) (comparing the ''traditional'' adversarial model 
of negotiation with a problem solving approach to negotiation and suggesting that the problem 
solving approach "presents opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and better quality 
solutions"). 
110. See generally CHRISTOPHER MOORE, 1lIE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAl. 
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (2d ed. 1996) (describing the stages and functions of the 
mediation process). 
Ill. See, e.g., MAXH. BAZERMAN,JUDGMENTIN MANAGERlALDECISIONMAKING (5th ed. 
2002) (describing both rational and "distorted" decision-making processes); JOHN S. HAMMOND 
ET Al.., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAl. GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1999) 
(describing rational decision-making strategies using risk analysis and quantitative analysis). 
112. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE WISE ADVISOR: WHAT EVERY 
PROFESSIONAl. SHOULD KNow ABOUT CONSULTING AND COUNSELING (2000) (discussing how 
to give effective advice as a professional). 
113. See e.g., James K.L. Lawrence, Mediation Advocacy: Parlnering with the Mediator, 
15 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 425,425-26 (2000) (discussing the need for lawyers to acquire 
skills other than those traditionally used in the courtroom); Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers' 
Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure 
Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 271 (1999) 
(discussing the need for lawyers to "redefine their method of advocacy or role to fit the 
mediation forum"); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. REsoL. 
1, 56-66 (describing "six qualities" that are important for lawyers representing clients in 
negotiation); cf Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: 
BUSiness as Usual?, 17 MEDIA nON Q. 377, 378 (2000) (setting forth empirical data concerning 
"the impact of mediation on legal negotiation"). 
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A review of the ethics issues surrounding these new fonns of ADR follows 
below. 
m. ETHICS ISSUES FOR THE LAWYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER AND DISPUTE 
RESOLVER 
I have argued in a variety of fora for recognition of the ethical dilemmas 
that lawyers face while serving in third-party neutral roles and in 
representative capacities in dispute resolution or consensus-building fora, 
which are distinguishable from conventional legal and more adversarial 
roles. 114 As chair of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and 
114. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility 
in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION Enncs 119 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 
2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in Enncs IN PRACTICE: 
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONsmILITIES, AND REGULATION 123 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) 
(describing the differences in "ethics" of non-adversariaI roles from the assumptions oflawyers' 
ethics of traditional roles); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of 
Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979,981-87 (2001 ) 
(discussing four ethical issues confronting the practice of ADR: counseling, confidentiality, 
conflicts of interest, and conflicts of law); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' 
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407,409 (1997) (explaining that the current ethical rules 
for lawyers are inadequate to address the role of lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals); 
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra note 64, at 958-61; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 
153,154 (1999) (noting that the current "rules of professionalism" for lawyers as advocates do 
not sufficiently address issues confronting lawyers serving in other roles); Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts, supra note 11, at 1160-61 (discussing ethical issues 
surrounding settlements of mass torts); Carrie Menke1-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks With Neutrals: 
ADR Hazards, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 109, 117 (1994) (discussing the. 
possibility of ethics rules that address ex parte communications in ADR); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 57, 60 
(1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?]( discussing the lack 
of guidance that legal ethics codes provide to lawyers who serve as mediators); Carrie Menke1-
Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-
Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 785 (1999) (suggesting that the conception 
of the lawyer's role as advocate should be broadened); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ProfeSSional 
Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 131 
( 1993) (discussing the absence of a clear consensus on ethical rules for third-party neutrals); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: 
Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631,632 (1997) (recognizing 
that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers fails to address issues confronting 
third-party neutrals, among others); Carrie Menke1-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets 
Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLAL. REv. 1871, 1911-22 
(1997) (addressing ethical standards in ADR); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR 
Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, DISP. REsoL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 3 
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Standards in ADR ("CPR-Georgetown Commission"), I testified before the 
ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, which was charged with redrafting the 
Model Rules, and urged the Commission to consider the ethical dilemmas that 
challenge lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals. The CPR-Georgetown 
Commission has drafted a proposed Model Rule to govern lawyers who serve 
as third-party neutrals. The proposed Model Rule addresses such issues as 
competence, diligence, fees, impartiality, conflicts of interest, and the fairness 
and integrity of the process. I IS Despite a great deal of lobbying activity by 
mediators, arbitrators, and third-party neutral organizations and the existence 
of ethical codes that offer guidance for mediators1l6 and arbitrators,1l7 the 
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission adopted a de minimis approach to deal with 
ethics issues in the practice of dispute resolution. 
The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended three changes to the Model 
Rules. The ABA House of Delegates approved the changes in February 2002, 
perhaps reflecting at least some recognition of ethics issues involving lawyers 
engaged in dispute resolution. The Preamble to the Model Rules reflects the 
role of the lawyer as a third-party neutral by stating that: "[i]n addition to 
these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, 
a non-representational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other 
matter. Some of these Rules apply directly to the lawyer who are or have 
served as third-party neutrals."lls In addition, revised Rule 2.4 fonnally 
recognizes the role of lawyers as 'third-party neutrals by stating: 
(a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or 
more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a 
dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party 
neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other 
capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter. 
(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented 
parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role 
in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's 
role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a 
(considering whether a lawyer who serves as an ADR representative should follow different 
ethical standards than one who serves in the traditional role as advocate). 
115. CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63. 
116. See. e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDlATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 
Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Prof Is in Dispute Resolution 1994). 
117. See. e.g., CODE OF Enncs FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. 
Arbitration Ass'n & Am. Bar Ass'n 1977) (being currently revised by committees of the 
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association Sections of Dispute 
Resolution, Business Law, and International Law, and the Center for Public Resources); see 
also RULES OF Enncs FOR INT'L ARBITRATORS (Int'l Bar Ass'n 1986). 
118. See MODEL RUlES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. , 3 (2002) (citing id. R. 1.12,2.4 
(2002»). 
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client. 119 
Comment [3] to Rule 2.4 discusses the different responsibilities of lawyers 
and non-lawyers serving as third-party neutrals and requires lawyers serving 
as neutrals to disclose that they are not representing parties to a dispute 
resolution event. 120 Comment [5] to Rule 2.4 also states that the lawyer who 
is serving as a representative of clients in arbitration or mediation has 
different duties of candor. 121 When appearing before a binding arbitration 
panel, the lawyer-representative has the full duty of candor before a 
"tribunal"122 under Rule 3.3;123 however, when appearing in a mediation 
proceeding, the duty of candor is governed by Rule 4.1,124 thus formalizing a 
different standard of candor in different dispute-resolution fora. 125 
Rule 1.12 addresses conflicts of interest that occur when a former judge, 
arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral works as a neutral (or law 
clerk) on a matter where parties to that matter seek subsequent representation 
in that matter or another from a law firm for which the mediator works. 126 The 
revised rule follows the old rule and allows a former judge, arbitrator, or 
mediator to serve as a representative only after receiving informed consent in 
writing from all parties. 127 In the event that a former judge, arbitrator, or 
mediator is disqualified from representation in a matter pursuant to Rule 
119. [d. R. 2.4. 
120. See id. R. 2.4 emt. [3]. 
121. See id. R. 2.4 emt. [5]. 
122. Tribunal is defined in Rule 1.0(m) as "a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration 
proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative 
capacity." [d. R. 1.0(m). 
123. Rule 3.3 requires, among other things, that a lawyer disclose adverse controlling 
authority. See id. R. 3.3. 
124. Rule 4.1 bars lawyers from knowingly making "a false statement of material fact or 
law to a third person" or "fail[ing] to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to 
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited .... " Id. 
R.4.1. 
125. Like the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the Model Rules 
distinguishes between the varying "tribunals," which include binding arbitration and other fora 
of legal dispute settlement, such as mediation-treated like private negotiation-and dispute 
settlement with a "reduced" duty of candor to an "adversary" or non-decisional facilitator. 
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 7, introductory note 
(1998) (stating that 
[t]he Chapter addresses situations. -.. in which the lawyer is 'representing a client in a 
matter before a tribunal.' . .. Thus ... the Chapter would be applicable in contested 
arbitration and similar trial-type proceedings, but it would not be applicable to a mediation 
(except mediation in the form ofa mock trial or similar contested proceeding», 
with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1 (addressing situations in which a lawyer 
appears before a binding arbitration panel or appears in a mediation proceeding). 
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a), (d). 
127. See id. R. 1.12(a). 
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1.12(a), partners in the fonner judge's, arbitrator's, or mediator's law finn 
may represent parties to that matter only with proper "screening."128 
Screening of otherwise disqualified third-party neutrals, a hotly contested 
ethical issue in deliberations concerning the ethics of conflict resolution, is 
intended to encourage law firms to allow lawyers in the same finn to serve as 
third-party neutrals and representatives.129 Comment [2] to Rule 1.12 
recognizes that "[0 ]ther law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals 
may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed 
disqualification."13o Rule 1. 12(d) continues to recognize the role ofa party-
chosen ''partisan'' arbitrator on a multi-member arbitration panel who is 
allowed to subsequently represent the party in the same matter. 131 
The Ethics 2000 Commission at least recognized the existence oflawyers 
serving as third-party neutrals; however, it failed to take a specific stand about 
a wide variety of potential ethical issues facing third-party neutrals and 
representatives in dispute-resolution activities. In failing to take such a stand, 
the Ethics 2000 Commission's revision of the Model Rules left out what I call 
the "many 'Cs'" of dispute-resolution ethics. 
128. Id. R. 1.12(c). The requirements for screening are provided for in the Model Rules. 
Id. R. 1.0(k). 
129. See generally CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63. 
130. MODELRUl.ES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.12 cmt. [2] (citing id. R. 2.4). 
131. Id. R. 1.l2(d). The role of the "non-neutral" partisan arbitrator is a feature of 
American commercial and labor arbitration and is becoming increasingly controversial in both 
domestic and international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, The Last Thing 
Dispute Resolution Needs is Two Sets of Lawyersfor Each Party, in INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY: 
THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR 48 (CPR lnst. for Dispute 
Resolution 2001) ("Quite simply, it is impossible to reconcile an obligation as an advocate with 
the role of impartial decision-maker."); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The 
Elusive Quest for Justice in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL Enncs 749, 750 (1995) 
(stating that U[i]n tripartite panel arbitrations, under the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), party-appointed arbitrators are permitted and even encouraged to be 
predisposed toward the position of their nominating party''). Many private international bodies 
of commercial arbitration have begun to limit severely or ban altogether the function of the 
partisan arbitrator; once chosen by the parties, all arbitrators are to behave as "neutrals." See, 
e.g., CPR RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION R. 7.3 (CPR lnst. for Dispute 
Resolution 2000) ("Each arbitrator shall disclose ... any circumstances that might give rise to 
justifiable doubt regarding the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.''); James H. Carter, 
Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for 
"NonNeutrals," II AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 295, 298-99 (2000) (questioning the wisdom of 
"overtly partisan" arbitrators and pointing out that U[p]rominent rules used in international 
arbitrations provide expressly that all arbitrators, including those appointed by the parties, must 
be impartial and independent."); see also Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra 
note 64; cf Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 
200 I ) (stating that "[ w ]here the parties have expressly agreed to select partial party arbitrators, 
the award should be confinned unless the objecting party proves that the party arbitrator'S 
partiality prejudicially affected the award"). 
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A. Counseling, Communication, and Comparisons 
Many dispute-resolution professionals have called for a fonnal ethical rule 
that would require lawyers to counsel clients about the availability of legal 
services beyond litigation and the more conventional forms of dispute-
resolution. A few states have enacted mandatory counseling rules, and many 
more states have used precatory language to suggest that lawyers should 
inform their clients of the many ways to solve a legal problem. In The duty to 
inform clients is included within the obligation to communicate with clients 
about the means chosen to effectuate their objectives. 133 While some think 
that it is unethical for a lawyer not to review other forms of dispute-resolution 
due to the lawyer's presumed conflict of interest in increased litigation fees, 134 
others suggest that the increased cost of counseling sessions required to 
compare adequately all of the possible forms of ADR and litigation might be 
prohibitive. 13s 
B. Consent, Choice, or Coercion: Of Courts and Contracts 
While the animating impulse behind most of the "ADR movement" has 
advocated for client choice in dispute resolution and "self-determination" in 
mediation, 136 parties are increasingly ordered into arbitration or mediation by 
pre-dispute contract clause assignments or court rules that require an ADR 
procedure before trial. The United States Supreme Court has sustained most 
contractual arbitration clauses l3? against a variety of challenges, and most 
132. For a review of these provisions, see Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be 
Required to Advise a Client of ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 433-36 (2000); 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professional Rules andADR: Control of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other Professional Responsibility 
Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 895, 902-06 (2001). 
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2. 
134. EDWARD J. BRUNET AND CHARLEs B. CRAVER, ALTERNATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTNE 250 (2001). 
135. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Michael L. Prigoff, Should There Be a Duty to Advise 
of ADR Options?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 51 (debating the argument that the additional costs 
associated with a lawyer explaining all options concerning ADR to clients would be an 
unreasonable burden on lawyers). 
136. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Principle I (Am. 
Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Profls in Dispute Resolution 1994) ("A 
Mediator shall Recognize that Mediation is Based on the Principle of Self-De termination by the 
Parties. "). 
137. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83,92 (2000) 
(upholding a mobile home financing agreement that req uired disputes to be resolved by binding 
arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991) (holding that "a 
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... can be subjected to 
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration 
HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 89 2002-2003
2002] THE LA WYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER 89 
courts have rej ected claims that court-annexed arbitration violates the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 138 Nevertheless, many legal scholars and 
lawyer-activists have denounced these trends, which are perceived as more 
"coercive," rather than freely-chosen, dispute-resolution processes. 139 Efforts 
continue in the courts, as well as in legislatures, to have such clauses declared 
unconscionable or unenforceable as adhesion contracts140 and to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration or mediation in a wide variety of disputes ranging from 
consumer, employment, and health care issues. 141 Some have asked whether 
application"). Contra Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing "the order compelling arbitration" and finding the Circuit City Dispute Resolution 
Agreement "an unconscionable contract of adhesion"). 
138. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The 
Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 503-08 (1989). Contra Richard C. Reuben, 
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949,956-57 (2000) (contending that "constitutional values" in ADR 
are "achievable, necessary, and desirable"); Jean Stern light, Rethinking the Constitutionality of 
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, 
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1,69-78 ( 1997) (stating that 
a preference for binding arbitration rather than litigation violates the Seventh Amendment in 
cases where the party is entitled to a jury trial). 
139. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, in 1996 
SUP. CT. REv. 331-32 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding commercial 
arbitration agreements); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in 
Alternative Justice Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 19, 26 
(1999) (discussing whether the "haves" hold an advantage in ADR); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,638-39 (1996) (criticizing the preference the Supreme 
Court gives to arbitration agreements, even when consumers do not know what they are 
signing); Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 703 (1999) (discussing the expanding scope of 
arbitration under the Act and concluding that "the Supreme Court's expansive doctrines, when 
applied to consumer transactions, contravene the statute's intent and undermine many important 
due process and substantive rights"); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected 
Mediation: What'sJustice Gotto Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788 (2001)(stating that 
"dispute resolution procedure increasingly resembles a traditional bilateral negotiation session 
between attorneys"). 
140. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d. at 891,896 (finding that the "Circuit City 
Dispute Resolution Agreement" was "an unconstitutional contract of adhesion" and reversing 
"the order compelling arbitration"); see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000) (reversing the order to enforce the arbitration agreement and 
finding the arbitration agreement "unconscionably unilateral"); Engalla v. Permanente Med. 
Group, 938 P.2d 903, 927 (Cal. 1997) (stating that 
[p]rivate arbitration may resolve disputes faster and cheaper than judicial proceedings. 
Private arbitration, however, may also become an instrument of injustice imposed on a 'take 
it or leave it' basis. The courts must ... ensure that private arbitration systems resolve 
disputes not only with speed and economy but also with fairness). 
141. See, e.g., Consumer Fairness Act of2002, H.R. 5162, 107th Congo § 1003(a)(2002) 
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it is unethical or unconscionable for a lawyer to draft such a "one-sided 
clause" in a contract when the drafter should know that the other party 
probably does not understand the ramifications of the agreement. 142 These 
"ethical" concerns go to the very core of the legitimacy and acceptability of 
dispute-resolution processes and the role of the lawyer in participating in 
processes that are regarded by many as unfair or violative of due process 
protections in the public sphere. 
C. Competence, Credentialing, and Qualifications 
Although most ethics codes enforce only a minimal level of "competence" 
and usually proclaim that ethics standards are not to be used to establish 
professional civil liability standards for malpractice,143 a question remains 
regarding what levels of minimal competence and diligence should be 
suggested in ethical codes regarding dispute-resolution services. In fields like 
mediation and arbitration that do not yet carry formal procedures for licensing 
and credentialing,l44 the question is whether ethics codes should be used to 
enforce a basic level of service, particularly in light of many courts holding 
that both arbitrators and mediators are "immune" from liability because of 
their performance of "quasi-judicial" functions.14s Indeed, the question of 
what professional ethics codes should regulate these "mixed" or hybrid 
professions, where practitioners come from a variety of disciplines, is also 
considered in the debate concerning whether mediation is the practice of 
lawl46 and thus subject to ethics rules for lawyers, and in the debate 
concerning whether mediation is performed at all when third-party neutrals 
legally evaluate a case rather than simply "facilitate" negotiations and 
communications between parties. 147 
(declaring arbitration clauses unenforceable as an unfair trade practice in consumer 
transactions); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of200l, H.R. 2282, \o7th Congo § 
3 (2001) (declaring unenforceable claims based on federal law arbitration clauses in 
employment contracts). 
142. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 134, at 174-75. 
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT pmb\. ., 20 (2002). 
144. See COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS, SOC'Y OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE REsOLUTION, 
QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES (1989). 
145. See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding ''that 
absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to mediators and case evaluators"); Howard v. 
Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893,903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding ''that absolute quasi-judicial 
inununity is properly extended to ... neutral third-parties"). 
146. See Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice 0/ law?, supra note 114; Bruce 
Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST 
LITIG. 74, 74 (1996); Joshua R. Schwartz, Layman Cannot Lawyer, But Is Mediation the 
Practice a/Law?, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1715, 1745-46 (1999). 
147. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, 13 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (I996); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus 
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D. Confidentiality 
Traditional lawyer ethics rules protect lawyer--client confidentialityl48 and 
evidentiary privilege; however, in mediation and arbitration, the parties and 
their lawyers usually appear before a third-party neutral, thereby eliminating 
traditional confidentiality protections. Confidentiality is protected in 
mediation and arbitration most often by a contract among the parties and the 
third-party neutral. Increasingly, at least with mediation, confidentiality is 
protected by statute 149 or common-law privilege. Confidentiality in mediation 
is complex because mediators often promise parties confidentiality in separate 
caucus sessions. Mediators can use different versions of promises about what 
they will reveal to the parties outside the caucus session. Thus, many 
mediator and arbitrator ethics rules will simply guarantee whatever 
confidentiality the parties and the third-party neutral promise each other, 
subject to applicable law. Recently, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association 
approved the Uniform Mediation Act to provide uniformity under state law in 
confidentiality protections and exceptions. However, whether a mediator may 
be called to testify about the existence or validity of a contract or whether an 
arbitrator may be called upon when arbitration awards are challenged may be 
a matter of federal law when cases are brought to federal court. ISO 
Confidentiality protections, whether based on evidentiary privilege, 
contract, or statute, may be waived pursuant to certain exceptions. For 
example, confidentiality may be waived in order to warn that someone may 
cause serious bodily harm to another. Moreover, disclosure of confidential 
information may be required to report crimes, such as child abuse or domestic 
violence. The Ethics 2000 Commission revisited these issues in its redrafting 
of Rule 1.6; however, recent developments at the federal level demonstrate the 
Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 988 
(1997). 
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). Rule 1.6 has always been 
subject to controversies about when disclosure of client misconduct to prevent a future serious 
crime of bodily hann or economic fraud may be permissible or even mandatory. See, e.g., N.J. 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998), available at http://www.njlawnet.com/nj-rpc/ 
rpc 1-6.htrnl (last visited Nov. I, 2002). 
149. See CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1119 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-
307 (2000); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 2002). 
ISO. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also In Re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that discovery of 
confidential mediation records in a federal agency proceeding investigating fraud is barred); 
Olam v. Congo Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121, 1124-25 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(concluding that a mediator could be called to testify under the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
a challenge to a mediation agreement in federal court where the enforcement of the contract and 
confidentiality issues were a question of state law). 
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volatility of this area. 151 The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended, 
consistent with the treatment of these issues in the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers, 152 that lawyers be permitted to disclose confidential 
client infonnation to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substantial financial loss or 
fraud; however, the ABA's House of Delegates rejected the recommendation. 
Nonetheless, recent scandals revealing corporate earnings and audit fraud 
have resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,153 which 
requires the SEC to adopt professional conduct rules for lawyers practicing 
before it and requires lawyers to reveal securities violations and other 
corporate misconduct to corporate officials and board members. 154 Thus, this 
new federal law will preempt state laws and state ethics rules on 
confidentiality in this context, and it will raise interesting questions about the 
role of mediators and arbitrators working on corporate matters. Revelation of 
a confidential fact from a mediation or arbitration proceeding is one of the few 
clear acts of malfeasance that can result in a successful malpractice action 
against a third-party neutral. ISS Therefore, with possible conflicting laws and 
duties to disclose, the area of confidentiality is fraught with difficulty.156 
E. Conflicts of Interest: Neutrality, Impartiality, and Lack of Bias 
Perhaps the most significant issue in debates about ethics in dispute-
resolution is the conflict of interest issue, which includes the types of 
disclosures that mediators and arbitrators should make about past, present, and 
future relationships with parties, lawyers, and witnesses to a dispute-
resolution proceeding. Another issue is whether a "conflict" should foreclose 
a third-party neutral's partner from undertaking subsequent representation of 
a party. Rule 1.12 of the proposed Model Rules adopted a permissible 
screening rule that permits an arbitrator or mediator's partners to engage in 
representation of parties in a mediation or arbitration 157 as long as appropriate 
screening has taken place according to Rule 1.0(k). Rule 1.12 is likely to 
remain controversial as it permits the law partners of mediators and arbitrators 
lSI. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
152. See RESTATEMENT (1HIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000). 
153. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 
II U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A., and 29 U.S.C.A.). 
154. See Cahill, Corporate Fraud Law, supra note 12, at'll I. 
ISS. See SARAH COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POllCY & PRACTICE 11-20 (2001). 
156. Mediators, in particular, often discuss the complexity of the civil "Miranda" warnings 
they must give parties in mediation. These warnings explain what is confidential and what 
might not be confidential. They must also explain that just because something is "confidential" 
in a mediation proceeding does not mean it is non-discoverable information in litigation or 
another legal proceeding. My mediation retainer agreement now runs about ten single-spaced 
pages in length and contains explanations and mutual covenants arnong the mediator, the 
parties, and the lawyers. 
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.12(c)(I) (2002). 
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to represent parties to a mediation or arbitration, 158 which could cast doubt on 
the neutrality and impartiality of the third party neutral (due to interests in 
future business with "satisfied" customers), and which could even allow the 
mediatior or arbitrator to represent the parties in the same matter upon 
receiving the consent of all parties, a step beyond that permitted by most 
mediators' understanding of what is permissible (never to undertake 
representation in the same matter). Furthermore, as I have argued 
elsewhere,ls9 the definitions of conflicts of interest in the proposed Model 
Rules do not elaborate on the particular conflicts that may occur in dispute-
resolution, such as possible interests in future business as a mediator, 
arbitrator, or trainer of a client and whether past representation of a client 
resulted in the selection of a particular mediator or "neutral" arbitrator. 
Beyond conflicts of interest, more stringent disclosure requirements now 
imposed by some states, such as California's Ethics Standards for 
Arbitrators, 160 require arbitrators to disclose past, present, or future financial, 
legal, economic, and personal relationships with all parties, witnesses, and 
lawyers to an arbitration and to include such relationships with their law and 
personal (including domestic) partners as well. Such strong disclosure 
requirements are intended to expose the possibility that certain arbitrators are 
"repeat players" with particular clients and to expose the existence of regular 
business to more "one shot" litigants in the arbitration system. So far, no 
mediation rules require such extensive disclosure of possible conflicts of 
interest, and indeed, most mediator ethics codes define "conflicts" quite 
generically and provide minimal guidance. Tennessee's proposed Rule 2.4 for 
the Lawyer as Dispute Resolution Neutral, for example, states that "a lawyer 
may serve as a dispute resolution neutral" when 
the lawyer reasonably believes he or she can be impartial as between the 
parties; '" [and] the lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral in the 
matter will not be adversely affected by the representation of clients with 
interests directly adverse to any of the parties to the dispute, by the lawyer's 
158. See id. R. 1.12. 
159. See sources cited supra note 114. 
160. See CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West Supp. 2002); see also Caroline E. Mayer, 
Arbitration Standards Challenged, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at EI (stating that U[t]he 
securities industry is pushing the state of Cali fomi a to exempt arbitrators that handle disputes 
against stock brokerages from new arbitration ethics standards that require more disclosure of 
conflicts of interests"). The National Association of Securities Dealers filed a complaint 
challenging the application of such state standards to its arbitration program for securities 
disputes and arguing that it is a self-regulating organization that is governed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission under federal regulatory authority. See Complaint, NASD Dispute 
Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of CaL, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02-
3486-SC), available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdf-textl072202_ca_cornplaint.pdf(lastvisited 
Nov. 1, 2002). 
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responsibilities to a client or third person, or by the lawyer's own interests; 161 
... [and] the lawyer consults with each of the parties, or their lawyers, about 
any interests of the lawyer, the lawyer's clients, the clients of other lawyers 
with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm, or third persons that may 
materially affect the lawyer's impartiality in the matter .... 162 
Tennessee's proposed Rule 2.4 imposes a "consultation" requirement but does 
not define what might constitute a disqualifying conflict of interest. Contrast 
this to the treatment in proposed Rule 4.5.4 of the CPR-Georgetown 
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, which specifies conflicts that 
automatically disqualify lawyers, conflicts to which parties may consent, and 
conflicts where screening permits some but not all of the law partners of a 
lawyer with a conflict of interest to work for parties to particular dispute-
resolution fora in different or substantially related matters. 163 
To the extent that not only the parties to a dispute-resolution event, but the 
general public who may watch lawyers repeatedly working for the same client 
or switching roles from mediator (neutral) to representative, the old concerns 
of "appearance of impropriety"l64 may have implications for the legitimacy of 
dispute-resolution fora. While "disclose and party consent" has become one 
practical approach to conflicts of interest, the conflicts of interest standards 
are further complicated by post-award challenges to arbitration for "evident 
partiality"16S or for failure to investigate possible conflicts. l66 In mediation, 
such challenges arise with analogies to the conflict rules of past, present, and 
future representation of parties in substantially related matters. 167 At stake are 
issues about access to confidential information, the loss of perceived or actual 
neutrality, the potential bias in the hope for future business from satisfied 
repeat players, and the perception of disloyalty or "role conflicts" when 
161. Query whether this is a subjective or objective standard. 
162. TENN. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 2.4(b)(3), (5) & (7) (effective Mar. 1 , 2003). 
163. CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63. 
164. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONsmlLlTY Canon 9 (1977). 
165. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.c. § 10(a)(2) (2000). Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), is the leading United States 
Supreme Court case on what standards of conflicts of interest should be applied to arbitrators, 
such as a judicial standard or a separate standard for "men of affairs." [d. at 150 (White, J., 
concurring). 
166. See, e.g., AI-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that 
arbitrator Kenneth Feinberg did not have a duty to investigate his former law firm's prior 
representation of one of the parties to the arbitration). 
167. See, e.g., PolySoftware Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-93 (D. Utah 1995) 
(stating that the client sought the disqualification of his adversaries' lawyer as a representative 
because the lawyer previously served as mediator in a substantially related matter and had 
access to confidential information about both parties to the litigation); Cho v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 863, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that disqualification of an "individual 
attorney and his or her firm is required where the attorney has been privy to confidences of a 
litigant while acting as a neutral arbitrator"). 
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lawyers from the same firm serve as neutral dispute resolvers and advocates 
for the same parties, and worse still, in the same matter. 168 The conflicts of 
interest area makes law before, during, and after dispute-resolution hearings 
occur and the continuing vagueness in most ethical codes, including the newly 
proposed Model Rules, promises to foster litigation at all of these points in 
time. 
F. Candor 
The obligations of candor that lawyers who serve as representatives, 
mediators, and arbitrators owe one another in dispute-resolution proceedings 
is also problematic. Under the proposed treatment ofthe Model Rules and the 
treatment in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,'69 only 
binding arbitrations are treated as "tribunals" under the applicable rules 
requiring the full duty of candor to the tribunal to report adverse controlling 
authority to the third-party neutral or arbitration pane1.170 All non-binding 
arbitrations and mediations are treated as if they were negotiations without the 
presence of third-party neutrals. However, Rule 4.1 prohibits any 
misstatement ofa "material fact or law"171 in this context. In mediations and 
non-binding arbitrations there are no obligations to volunteer information or 
to correct misinformation by other parties or lawyers in the proceedings unless 
the duty is imposed by other law, such as state fraud law or rules of civil 
procedure. Mediation, perhaps even more than litigation, relies on candid 
statements of the parties regarding their needs, interests, and objectives. It 
seems particularly odd, therefore, that the comments to Rule 4.1, which permit 
certain forms of "deception"l72 in negotiation, would be permitted in 
mediation. While some are concerned that lawyers are not forced to be more 
"candid" with mediators than they would be with other lawyers in dyadic 
negotiations, a failure to specify more rigorous standards of honesty, as well 
as requirements for disclosure of facts, interests, and laws can particularly 
harm dispute-resolution and consensus-building efforts. Consequently, many 
third-party neutrals feel the need to contract for greater obligations of 
disclosure and honesty than is currently required in law or ethics codes. 
168. Because of the concern about actual and perceived conflicts and "role switching," 
many third-party neutrals have left their law firms to form specialized dispute-resolution firms. 
For examples, see the practices of such leading mediators as Kenneth Feinberg and John 
Bickerman (both formerly of Kaye Scholer in Washington, D.C.), John Upchurch in Florida, . 
and Bruce Meyerson in Arizona (formerly with Steptoe & Johnson in Phoenix). 
169. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2002). 
171. [d. R. 4.1. 
172. These forms include "puffing" about the value of a bargained-for item, parties' 
settlement preferences, and whether or not the negotiator is working for a particular principal. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 emt. [2]. 
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G. Costs and Fees 
While much of the debate about fees and costs in the deliberations of the 
Ethics 2000 Commission revolved around the desirability of written contracts 
for lawyer fees, this issue has not figured as heavily in the mediation and 
arbitration area, perhaps because so much ADR is contractually based with 
fees specified or because these activities occur in court settings where fees are 
specified or disallowed. A more critical issue in the dispute-resolution field 
is the controversy surrounding the use of particular forms of fees, such as fees 
contingent on settlement or "bonuses." Many professionals in the field 
believe that such contingent fees should never be used to give third-party 
neutrals a "stake" in the settlement or resolution of a matter; however, others 
suggest that making fees contingent on success of the proceeding allows 
reluctant parties to participate without incurring additional pre-litigation fees 
and costs. Ethical issues also arise when one party bears all the costs and fees 
because the third-party neutral may favor the paying party in hopes of 
receiving future business. 173 However, some courts believe that placing all of 
the costs on the wealthier party, such as an employer, enables poorer parties 
to participate. 174 Because so much of ADR is private, transparency and 
monitoring of particular cost and fee issues may be particularly difficult. 
H Contexts 
The increased use of the various forms of dispute resolution in many areas 
has caused some to a call for ethics regulation in particular contexts according 
to subject matterl7S and according to whether the dispute-resolution 
173. See Hass v. County of San Bernadino, 45 P.3d 280, 291-93 (2002) (reversing an 
administrative hearing decision where the government paid the hearing officer who was likely 
to get future business from the government). 
174. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the employer should pay all ofthe arbitrator's fees and expenses for claimants in 
mandatory employment arbitration). 
175. These subject areas range from employment, environmental, family, consumer, and 
health disputes, to securities and mass tort class actions, and complex international commercial 
disputes and transactions, which involve both individuals and multiple corporate or institutional 
entities. There has already been a great deal of activity in the effort to draft ethical standards 
for specific subject-matter disputes. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR F AMll. Y & 
DIVORCE MEDIATION (Am. Bar Ass'n 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/ 
family/fccrdraft.doc; DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER 
DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Nat'l Consumer Disputes Advisory Comm. 1998), available 
at http://www.adr.org; A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR RESOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE DISPUTES 
(Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Med. Ass'n Comm'n on Health Care Dispute 
Resolution 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n & Am. Bar Ass'n 1977), available at 
http://www.adr.org;RULESOFETHICSFORINT·LARBITRATORS(Int.IBarAss·n 1986); see also 
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proceeding is being conducted in private or within the courts 176 or 
governmental agencies. 177 Whether the different kinds of 
processes-arbitration, mediation, and consensus building-have their own 
"moralities"-a claim made famously and rigorously by the jurisprude Lon 
Fuller many years ago l7S_requiring their own functional logic and ethics is 
also a lively and continuing debate among those who promulgate ethical 
rules. 179 
I Compliance, Enforcement, Liability, and Immunity 
State disciplinary bodies enforce legal ethical codes. Formed as either 
independent state agencies or divisions of the state supreme court, state 
disciplinary bodies are responsible for. regulating the state's legal 
profession. ISO Professional associations that promulgate specialized ethical 
Complaint, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02346-56), available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdf-
textl072202 _ ca _complaint. pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (arguing that regulation ofNASD' s 
arbitrators in security broker disputes should be left to "self-regulating organizations," which 
are regulated by federal agencies); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts, 
supra note 11, at 1188 (suggesting that different ethical rules should apply to the settlements 
of mass tort claims). 
176. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 1-1 (2002) (stating that the rules apply to ADR proceedings 
"in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California"); ROBERT J. NIEMIC 
ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR (2001) 
(offering methods that federal courts may follow in selecting, referring, and managing cases in 
ADR), available at www.fjc.gov; REPORT OF THE ADR TASK FORCE OF THE COURT ADMIN. & 
CASEMGMT. COMM., GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE COURT-ANNEXED ADR: 
ATTRIBUTES OF A WEll-FUNCTIONING ADR PROGRAM AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR ADR 
NEUTRALS (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1997), reprinted in CIVll. LmGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 
app. B, at 395 (U.S. Judicial Conference 200 1), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/civillitig/ 
civillitig04.pdf. 
177. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84 (2000) (providing governing rules for ADR in the 
context of governmental agencies). 
178. See LoN FUlLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LoN L. 
FUUER (Kenneth 1. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001). 
179. See generally Catherine Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a 
Code 0/ Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2001)( observing that 
"[i]nternational arbitration dwells in an ethical no-man's land" and seeking to "develop a 
methodology for prescribing the normative content of a code of ethics for international 
arbitration"). See also Catherine Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney 
Regulation: Developing an Enforcement Regime/or International Arbitration, STAN. J. OF 
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2002) (suggesting that ethics rules in dispute resolution must "fit" the 
particular functions performed and may vary with the context in which the dispute resolution 
process occurs). 
180. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REv. I, 3 
(1991 ). 
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codes often have ethics committees to perform oversight or to issue advisory 
opinions; however, without licensing for ADRprofessionals, formal sanctions 
hardly exist for "unethical" conduct by third-party neutrals. 181 Some 
professional organizations will strike the names of "censured" professionals 
from their rosters as a means of discipline; 182 however, there is a question 
regarding whether a form of due process must be provided to a mediator, 
arbitrator, or neutral before his or her name is stricken from court-maintained 
rolls. A few states have developed formal bodies of disciplinary authority for 
mediators and arbitrators, 183 particularly for those professionals who are listed 
on court or government rosters. At the intemationallevel, organizations that 
sponsor and administer international commercial arbitration adjudicate 
"challenge" claims against arbitrators suspected of having conflicts of interest 
or who commit misconduct, and poSt-hoc challenges to arbitral awards may 
also involve some post-hoc judicial rulings on the appropriateness of arbitrator 
conduct. 184 Relatively few malpractice claims are filed against both 
mediators l8S and arbitrators l86 in large part because a judicial policy 
supporting alternative dispute resolution has granted either absolute or "quasi-
judicial" immunity to mediators (at least in the court setting) and arbitrators 
(even in private settings who are seen to be performing adjudicative 
services)187 through both case law and statutory grants of immunity. 188 
181. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N. Y. U. L. REv. 
493,545 (1989) (suggesting that the most effective form of "discipline" for unethical behavior 
in negotiation is the lawyer's reputation in the market); CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics 
& Standards of Practice in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations pmbl., at 5 (2002) 
[hereinafter CPR-Georgetown Principles] (stating that "[i]n addition to establishing a 
benchmark for responsible practice," the CPR-Georgetown Commission aims to "enhance 
understanding of the ADR field's special responsibilities, as justice providers, to provide fair, 
impartial and quality process"). 
182. See Reuben, supra note 138, at 1013. 
183. See FLA. STAT. § 44.201 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 10.900 (West Supp. 2002); see 
also Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's 
Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701,719 (1994) (stating that "[t]o 
the author's knowledge, Florida is the first state to adopt a procedure to enforce mediator 
standards of conduct"); FLA. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CrR., MEDIATOR QUALIFICATIONS BOARD 
UPDATE (1996), available at http://www.flcourts.orgloscaldivisionsladrlbrochure.html. 
184. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra note 64, at 963-66,970-74. 
185. But see, e.g., Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 237-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) 
(reversing a $74,000 jury verdict against a lawyer who served as a mediator for the husband and 
wife who were divorcing). 
186. But see, e.g., Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(declining "to grant quasi-judicial immunity to an arbitrator who breached his contract to render 
a timely award"). 
187. Id. at 836-37 (stating that courts "have long recognized immunity to protect arbitrators 
from civil liability for actions taken in the arbitrator's quasi-judicial capacity"). 
188. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1297.432 (West Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
44.201(6) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(j) (2001); see a/so SARAH COlE ET AL., 
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J. Corporate, Organizational, and Provider Liability 
Perhaps because there is so little "quality control" of individual 
practitioners of dispute-resolution, demand has grown for oversight or 
regulation of dispute-resolution service providers. In response to the ongoing 
objections to mandatory arbitration in employment, consumer, and health care 
disputes, a variety of organizations have engaged in voluntary self-regulation 
by adopting "due process protocols." Such protocols provide basic standards 
to ensure fairness in the conduct of mediation and arbitration proceedings that 
usually originate from contractual dispute-resolution clauses. 189 
Following suggestions in legal commentary that entities and organizations 
should be held responsible for their actions in providing legal services,19O the 
CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR promulgated 
the Principles for ADR Provider Organizations ("Principles"), the first ever 
set of standards for ADR service provider organizations. These standards are 
designed to "offer a framework for responsible practice by entities that 
promise ADR service"191; they suggest "best practices" and "baseline" 
measures for provider organizations in the provision of arbitration, mediation 
and other forms of ADR services. Unless adopted by state legislatures or 
appropriate state governmental entities,I92 these standards do not have the 
MEDIATION: LAW, POUCY AND PRACTICE ch. II (2001) (reviewing state law (common and 
statutory) on immunity and malpractice standards in mediation). Compare Joseph B. Stulberg, 
Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 85, 85 (1986) (arguing in favor of mediator 
immunity), with Amanda K. Esquibel, The Case of the Conflicted Mediator: An Argument for 
Liability and Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 131, 134 (1999) (arguing against mediator 
immunity). The New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to permit mediator immunity due to 
the absence of quality control protections. See N.J. Sup. Ct., Task Force Report on 
Complementary Dispute Resolution, 124 N.J. L.J. 90 (1990). 
189. See,e.g.,DUEPROCESSPROTOCOLFORMEDIATIONANDARBITRATIONOFSTATUTORY 
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (Am. Bar Ass'n 1995), available 
at http://www.bna.com; A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR RESOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE 
DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Med. Ass'n Comm'n on Health Care 
Dispute Resolution 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR 
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Nat'l 
Consumer Disputes AdvisoryComm. 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; JAMSPOUCYON 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MlNIMuM STANDARDS OFPROCEDURALF AIRNESS (2002), available 
at http://www.jarnsadr.comlemployrnentArb_min_stds.asp. 
190. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 180, at 5-4 (arguing that "[a]s law firms grow, the 
potential harm they can inflict on clients, third parties, and the legal process grows as well"). 
191. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, pmbJ., at 5. 
192. See, e.g., CHARLES POU, JR., DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVS., MEDIATOR QUAUTY 
ASSURANCE: A REPORTTO THE MD. MEDIATOR QUALITY AsSURANCE OVERSIGHTCoMM. (Feb. 
2002), available at http://www.acresolution.org; see also UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV., 
MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR MEDIATORS OF POSTAL SERVICE DISPUTES, CERTIFICATION FOR 
REDRESS MEDIATORS, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR POST AL SERVICE MEDIATIONS, available 
at http://www.usps.comlcpimlftp/pubsipubI02.html. 
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force of law. They have, however, become a discussion document for 
assessing quality in state dispute-resolution programs. 193 The Principles state 
that organizations that refer, suggest, train, or provide individual dispute 
resolution services have responsibilities to ensure the quality and 
competence 194 of individuals that appear on their lists or rosters, 19S "to provide 
clear, accurate and understandable information" about the services 
provided,196 to take "reasonable steps" to make services available to "low-
income parties[,]"197 to disclose all appropriate conflicts of interest, 198 to make 
available a grievance or complaint mechanism for the services offered,199 to 
require neutrals to adhere to "reputable internal or external" ethics codes,2°O 
to avoid making "false or misleading" statements about services provided/o1 
and to take appropriate steps to ensure that services that are provided are done 
so in a "fundamentally fair" and "impartial manner."202 Principle I also 
recognizes that the obligations under these standards may vary with the degree 
of knowledge and sophistication on the part of parties that actively and 
thoroughly screen and select particular neutrals.203 Although William Slate, 
the President of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), served on the 
CPR-Georgetown Commission, his organization did not "fully endorse" the 
Principles; instead, the AAA adopted its own set of principles204 due to a 
concern that the CPR-Georgetown Principles would become legally 
enforceable standards for potential organizational liability. 
Given the efforts of ADR organizations such as the AAA, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (''NASD''), and the Judicial Arbitration 
and Mediation Services, Inc. ("JAMS") to self-regulate by adopting their own 
internal organizational ethical and practice standards,20s it remains to be seen 
whether courts or other bodies will hold provider organizations206 or the 
193. See Conference ofSoc'yofProfls in Dispute Resolution, Albuquerque, N.M. (Sept. 
2000), available at http://www.acresolution.org. 
194. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, cmt., at 6. 
195. [d. Principle I, at 7. 
196. [d. Principle II, at 9. 
197. [d. Principle IV, at 10. 
198. [d. Principle V, at 10. 
199. [d. Principle VI, at 12. 
200. [d. Principle VII, at 12. 
201. [d. Principle VIII, at 13. 
202. [d. Principle III, at 10. 
203. [d. Principle I(b), at 7. 
204. See Arbitration, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, available 
at httpll:www.adr.org. 
205. See CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, pmbl., at 5. 
206. Some organizations, such as the Academy of Civil Trial Mediators and the National 
Academy of Arbitrators have elected members based on experience and reputation in the field. 
It remains to be seen whether conferring "honorific" status wiII insure any more quality than 
less exclusive organizational providers. Government agencies are also providing rosters of 
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individuals on their rosters to their self-imposed standards of quality, 
competence, and liability.207 
K. Complaints and Grievances 
As ethicists, consumers, and professionals advocate for more official 
regulation of the provision of private and public dispute resolution services, 
many have suggested that users of dispute-resolution services should have 
formal opportunities to raise questions and grievances about the process, 
especially where provider organizations (as well as courts and government 
agencies) select, list, train, and refer the third-party neutrals assigned. Many 
formal ADR organizations have grievance committees or ethics committees, 
which range from the Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of 
Commerce to an ad hoc ethics committee at CPR, to rule on challenges 
regarding conflicts of interest, misconduct, or other alleged ethical 
"violations." There are as yet, however, no formal requirements that such 
organizations provide procedures for enforcing even their own rules. The 
CPR-Georgetown Principles suggest that provider organizations "should 
provide mechanisms for addressing grievances about the Organization, and its 
administration or the neutral services offered, and should disclose the nature 
and availability of the mechanisms to the parties . . . . ,,208 Courts, to some 
extent, have begun scrutinizing the work of particular providers,209 especially 
when a single provider is used throughout a particular industry. The existence 
of a formal complaint and grievance procedure is likely to render that provider 
more acceptable to regulators. 
L. Conflict of Laws 
The above discussion should make clear that there are now many sources 
of rules, statutes, standards, and regulations for ethical and good practices in 
neutrals, who are usually "certified" after acquiring specified amounts of experience, otherwise 
known as "flying time." 
207. One test was the litigation between the NASD and the California Judicial Council, 
which attempted to regulate ethical standards for all arbitrators in California. See Complaint, 
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal. (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02-3486-
sq, available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdf-textl072202_ca_complaint.pdf(last visited Nov. 
1,2002). Rather than deciding the merits of the case, however, the district court dismissed the 
case on Eleventh Amendment state immunity grounds. See id. 
208. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, Principle VI, at 12. Principle VI also 
suggests that the organization provide a "fair and impartial process for the affected neutral or 
other individual against whom a grievance has been made." [d. 
209. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903, 908 (Cal. 1997) 
(concluding, in part, "that there is indeed evidence to support the trial court's initial findings 
that Kaiser engaged in fraudulent conduct justifYing a denial of its petition to compel 
arbitration "). 
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the provision of dispute-resolution and consensus-building services. Such 
sources include federal statutes, regulations, and case law, as well as state 
substantive and ethical regulation and private rules of associations. At the 
international level, private associations, such as the ICC, the London Court of 
International Arbitration, the AAA, and courts, which are asked to enforce or 
vacate arbitral awards, will rule on the ethics and conduct of third-party 
neutrals. In the United States, where there is currently a great deal of 
advocacy in both courts and legislatures about the unfairness of mandatory 
contractual dispute resolution (particularly arbitration), proposals for new 
layers of regulation are pending at every level of governmental action. 
Finding the relevant ethical rule or statutory standard in a private or public 
dispute-resolution proceeding, negotiated rule-making, or consensus-building 
process is difficult, but once found, duties may conflict with confidentiality 
protections in mediation/tO as in the case of governmental transparency and 
public infonnation policies, and in the case offederal-state conflicts oflaws, 
rules, and policies. For example, the new federal corporate fraud act, which 
requires lawyers to "whistleblow" on their clients' economic fraud, may 
conflict with and may thus preempt state ethics rules that protect client 
confidentiality . 
Mediators, arbitrators, and facilitators in courts and governmental 
administrative proceedings may be subject to governmental rules, state ethics 
codes, the ethical rules of professional associations or provider associations 
of which they are members, and the contractual or retainer provisions signed 
by the parties to a particular proceeding. Thus, dispute resolvers and 
facilitators operate in public and private settings with a variety of parties who 
are not "clients" in the representational sense but who are "clients" of the 
dispute-resolution process and may be owed different sets of ethical and 
practice protections. There have been efforts to promulgate more uniform 
rules, as in the case of confidentiality rules in the Uniform Mediation Act and 
joint action rules on the part of multiple organizations2tt to create some 
210. See In reGrand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1998); Cincinnati Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988); Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust 
& Says. Ass'n. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d. 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986); Olam v. 
Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121-23 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Neary v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 123 (Cal. 1992); see also News-Press Publ'g Co. v. Lee County, 
570 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling on conflicts between state "sunshine 
laws" for state administrative agency deliberations and the conflicting policy of confidentiality 
in mediation); Kate Marquess, South Carolina Moves Toward Squelching Secrecy: Sealed 
Settlements Could Become a Thing of the Past, I A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Aug. 9, 2002, ,. 1, 
available at WL 30 ABAJEREP 6 (stating that "South Carolina's federal courts may become 
the first in the nation to ban sealed settlements"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to 
Private Settlements: Conflicting Legal Policies, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG. 85 
(1993) (reviewing the conflicting policies in protecting the privacy of legal settlements and the 
"public interest"). 
211. Examples include the AAAI ABAISPIDR Joint Standards of Conduct for Mediators 
HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 103 2002-2003
2002] THE LA WYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER 103 
consensually arrived at standards of conduct and best practices; however, 
courts and legislatures212 do not always defer to such efforts.213 
For those who argue that dispute-resolution and consensus-building 
processes are ultimately voluntary, consensual, and often private, the ultimate 
jurisprudential challenges of the moment involve the appropriate level of 
public regulation and the relation of private self-regulation to more public 
processes, such as court mediation and administrative reg-neg, and to the wide 
variety of hybrid processes, such as when a court-annexed mediation is 
conducted in a private law office. To the extent that we are becoming aware 
of the many ethical and practice issues implicated in "the more conventional" 
and legally based forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration and 
mediation, we are just beginning to recognize and consider some of the more 
,-,,,,,,",,",,l_v 0+"";,..,.,,1 ~~,""...o. ... ~ __ 1~ __ ...... .J;_ .'L._ .. -- _~ .. 'L_ ---- -':,'L_1' ___ :~_ 1'1""0· U·l· 
..",u ... .,&--...n ""'''&1.4''''141. &~.,,,n, ... ., &Ul}ll.l"'''''"",,,U 1&1 Llli(;; U.,C VI ute;:; UIUIC \iJus,UCl1glug, 
more democratic, forms of deliberation in consensus-building and public-
policy fora to which I now tum. 
M. Consensus Building 
Our hopes for using democratic deliberative fora to deal with complex 
social, legal, and economic policy issues and disputes at all levels of human 
interaction, such as the local, state, national, and international levels, raise 
additional ethical concerns for the neutral facilitators of these processes as 
well as for the participating parties. At the outset, the assumption of these 
processes is that many stakeholders must be identified and invited in by 
someone, usually the "convener" ofthe process, who may serve as a "host," 
a "leader," or a consulting "facilitator." Ensuring that a consensus-building 
process is legitimate by inviting all appropriate stakeholders is widely 
regarded as the key to the success of such processes and distinguishes such a 
deliberative democratic process from more conventional lawsuits or 
transactional matters. Once many stakeholders are invited in, however, 
complicated issues of process management and decision rules will arise. 
Furthermore, the biggest challenge for neutral facilitators involves how to 
handle extremists, "hold-outs," or others who seek to prevent agreements from 
occurring for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. 
and the Due Process Protocols mentioned in this Article. See sources cited supra notes 136 and 
175. 
212. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2002). 
213. Courts ruling on challenges to arbitral awards, in particular, have often refused to 
adhere to privately adopted ethical standards when deciding whether an arbitrator demonstrated 
"evident partiality" in order to vacate an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act. See, 
e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the 
American Arbitration Association's "Commercial Arbitration Rules and Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators ... do not have the force of law''); see also Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal 
Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "the district court erred in placing 
primary emphasis on whether [the] party arbitrator ... violated ... the Code of Ethics"). 
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Consensus-seeking facilitators always face ethical issues regarding 
transparency, privacy, and secrecy in deliberations214 where private caucuses 
allow side deals and trades without public posturing but which ultimately 
must be disclosed to all interested parties and to the public to assure 
acceptability. Facilitators or managers of these complex processes must also 
deal with power imbalances between parties, especially where many parties 
do not have legal or other types of representation or substantive expertise.21S 
In a decisional process that is designed to maximize both participation and 
substantive results (meaning inducement of and satisfaction of the needs and 
interests of the greatest number of participants), one way to approach power 
imbalances is to provide preliminary process training to all participants. Thus, 
consensus-building professionals, like Lawrence Susskind of the Consensus 
Building Institute and Chris Carlson of the Policy Consensus Institute, provide 
negotiation training to participants before beginning a policy-setting 
consensus-building event. This training is called "capacity building," which 
may empower participants to learn process skills that will transcend 
participation in a particular event. In the environmental area,216 for example, 
former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt encouraged the use of the 
Habitat Conservation Plan processes to encourage the development oflarge-
area ecosystem conservation and development plans to avoid the "zero-sum" 
gridlock involved in enforcing the Endangered Species Act. Secretary Babbitt 
did this by encouraging negotiated plans for species preservation, resource 
management, scientific monitoring, and goal-setting among a diverse group 
of governmental, environmental, and developer actors across the nation.217 
214. See ELSTER, ALcHEMIES OF THE MIND, supra note 72, at 250-51 (discussing different 
constitutional substantive arrangements that he attributes to differences in public versus private 
constitutional deliberations in America and France in the eighteenth century). 
215. For the debates about power imbalances in dyadic mediation, see generally Trina 
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 1 00 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) 
(discussing the application of mandatory mediation to family law and concluding that 
"mandatory mediation provides neither a more just nor a more humane alternative to the 
adversarial system of adjudication of custody, and, therefore, does not fulfill its promises"). 
Power imbalances in deliberative democracy experiments have emerged as a key point of 
critique. See, e.g., Young, supra note 77; see also Lawrence Susskind, Environmental 
Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REv. 1, 15 (1981) ("Mediators may ... 
have to build the basic negotiating capabilities of one or more of the parties to ensure more 
equal bargaining relationships."). 
216. For one ofthe most cited examples ofthe use of consensus building for environmental 
problem-solving, see JOSH EAGLE, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW AND POllCY PROGRAM, PUBUC PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL FOREST 
MANAGEMENT: THE SIERRA NEVADA FRAMEWORK FOR CONSERVA nON AND COllABORATION 
AND THE QUINCY LmRARY GROUP (SLS Case No.98-026 1998) (developing models for public 
participation in forest management with local, regional, and national interests). 
217. See Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Decisions 
are Made, in INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING 
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With repeated uses of these processes, the hope and theory is that capacity for 
participation will be enhanced by education and increased experience.218 
The use of public-policy fora and consensus-building processes is 
sufficiently new and complex in its attempt to provide real democratic 
participation opportunities and demonstrate its effectiveness that it may be too 
early to lay down definitive ethical standards and norms. Furthermore, 
because the kind of professionals capable of leading, facilitating, and 
managing such processes are sufficiently diverse,219 it is probably unwise to 
establish ethical standards within a particular discipline, such as law. 
Nevertheless, articulating aspirational standards and "best practices," which 
attempt to specify widely shared, if not universal, norms,220 is a useful way to 
begin a debate and discussion about the best and most effective and fairest 
ways to conduct these processes. The foiiowing vaiues can be said to inform 
the work of many who serve as professional facilitators of public participation 
and deliberative processes and may serve as a basis for an ethics code for this 
portion of the field.221 
ANDADR 13 (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution 2001); Fung & Wright, supra note 75. 
218. Of course, this can work both ways. Repeat player developers, like Wal-Mart, learn 
how to "play" communities against each other in what they offer or demand in terms of tax 
relief, jobs promised, and community services supported. 
219. At least one multi-disciplinary professional association, the International Association 
for Public Participation, has already emerged in this field. See International Association for 
Public Participation, About IAP2, at http://www.iap2.org/boardlinklaboutiap2.html (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2002). "IAP2 is primarily concerned with process, rather than specific positions on 
issues. Indeed, we regard ourselves primarily as facilitators--people who work to make 
planning and decision processes more inclusive and transparent." International Association 
for Public Participation, IAP2 Home Page News!, at http://www.iap2.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2002). 
220. For a history ofthe United Nations' negotiation and drafting process ofthe Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DEClARA nON OF HUMAN RIGms 71 (200 I), where Eleanor 
Roosevelt advocated for a "mora\1y binding ... declaration, rather than a legal1y binding 
international agreement." 
221. These core values are from my own experience in the field and my efforts to specify 
a set of aspirations when I teach and train others for this type of work. For the last few years, 
I have been part of an informal group of "senior mediators and facilitators" who meet annua\1y 
at the Western Justice Center in Pasadena to share ideas and experiences in the field. The 
group has informa\1y worked on developing a "consensus" about the core values of our field. 
The issues and values expressed above have not been endorsed by this group or any other with 
which I work and are provided for illustrative and discussion purposes only. I would like to 
extend a special thanks to Lawrence Susskind who initiated this discussion and began this work. 
My statement of "core values" here suggests "principles of practice and ethics" for both 
participants and leaders or facilitators of these processes. A more complete statement may also 
specify another set of principles for those who, like lawyers, represent parties and participants 
in proceedings. Here, I have chosen to treat "participants" as parties and their representatives. 
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1. Broad Stakeholder Identification 
To the extent possible, all parties and groups with a "stake" or interest, or 
those who might otherwise be affected by a decision in a matter, should be 
invited to participate or should be represented by those whose individual 
interests are reasonably comparable. 
2. Opportunity to Participate and Have a Voice 
All identified stakeholders, whether direct constituents or in represented 
capacities, should have adequate opportunities to be heard and to participate 
in proceedings that may result in decisions affecting them. Parties and 
stakeholders should be able to choose representatives to represent or express 
their interests. 
3. Participant Agreement on Process and Ground Rules 
Clear rules of procedure and process for participation should be "agreed" 
to by the participants. Recognizing that some participants in consensus-
building events democratically select their own rules while others agree to use 
the procedures suggested by expert facilitators, there should be a prior 
agreement before deliberations begin regarding how participants will behave. 
Where possible, agendas should be set in advance, and procedures for 
recording, taking minutes, or information sharing should be developed. 
Protocols and rules about publicity, transparency, or confidentiality and secret 
or protected deliberations should be specified. Where possible, participants 
should agree on enforcement mechanisms for monitoring and adhering to such 
process guidelines and procedures. Expectations of participatory norms, such 
as attendance, speaking turns, degree of candor, use of experts and scientific 
or factual data, and processes for joint fact-fmding, should be specified. 
4. Participant Agreement to Decision Rules 
Before commencing deliberations and taking actions, participants should 
agree on the "rules of decision" to employ in order to specify what constitutes 
"consensus." Consensus need not involve unanimity or majority vote but 
should specify what participants will consider sufficient for a "decision" or 
"action" to be taken or a recommendation to be made to the appropriate 
governmental or other action authorities. 
5. Participant Recognition of Individual. Mutual, and Joint Gains and 
Improvements 
ParticiDants should seek. where DOssible, to recognize individual, mutual, 
and joint gains and improvements. The purposes of consensus building 
processes are not to replicate other forms of binary "zero-sum" decision-
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making, but to seek ways to satisfy the needs, interests, and objectives of all 
the participants. Such participation processes seek to achieve Pareto-optimal 
and creative outcomes; in other words, the process seeks to maximize joint 
gain without unnecessarily causing harm or unagreed-to losses to any other 
participants. 
6. Justified Bases for Claims, Arguments, Needs, and Interests 
Participants should be able to express justifications for their views, 
arguments, needs, and objectives by explaining why particular outcomes or 
principles are important. Justifications may include reasons, data, values, 
beliefs, and emotions. 
7. Fair Hearing and Respect for All Participants 
All participants should respectfully listen to and attempt to understand the 
perspectives of all other participants. Process and ground rules s~ould specify 
the rules of discussion, deliberation, and decision and how participants should 
demonstrate respect for differences among participants. 
8. Seeking Creative and Tailored Decisions and Solutions 
Participants and leaders or facilitators should seek creative and tailored 
decisions and solutions to their policy or dispute resolution objectives. 
Public-policy deliberation and consensus-building fora are designed to 
increase the possibility of fmding tailored solutions to particular problems, 
conflicts, and disputes, as well as to create new entities or relationships to 
handle specific issues. Decisions taken or solutions crafted for particular 
problems need not be based on precedent but should offer the opportunity to 
develop specific and "localized" solutions.222 
9. Third-Party Neutrals Should be "Clean" 
Facilitators. mediators. or other third-party neutrals or intermediaries who 
assist and guide such participatory processes should act without bias or 
partisanship and should be accountable and acceptable to the participants in 
222. Note that in consensus building involving environmental and administrative 
regulatory issues, tensions arise between localized "solutions" and the need for more regional, 
national, or universal standards. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 68. Proponents of consensus 
building suggest that information coordination should be available, whether through formal 
governmental processes or more informal information sharing. In administrative regulatory 
literature, information coordination has been variously described as benchmarking, standard 
monitoring, and innovation sharing. See CHARLEs SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD 
ENVIRONMENTAUSM 4 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers ed5., 2000). 
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the process. Third-party neutrals should disclose past, present, or potential 
future relationships and conflicts of interest with the participants or issues, 
which may cause the process to be perceived as biased. Where professionals 
or process experts are used to facilitate consensus-building processes, they 
should be chosen by and be accountable to the participants. Such third-party 
neutrals should act without partisanship and bias and should conduct 
themselves fairly.223 
10. Facilitation of Dialogue 
Facilitators. mediators. intermediaries. or other third-party neutrals should 
act to effectivelv facilitate dialolZUe. discussion and deliberation. to promote 
creative and efficacious oroblem solving. and to otherwise productively and 
fairly manage a consensus-seeking process. 
11. Enhanced Capacities 
Facilitators, mediators, intermediaries, or other third-party neutrals should 
enhance the capacities of participants to participate in such processes in the 
present and in the future with other parties. Where possible, process experts 
should be sure that parties learn how to negotiate, deal with differences and 
conflicts, and deliberate and dialogue with each other effectively. Enhanced 
capacity should occur not only to maximize effective participation in a 
particular event but also to improve and facilitate future dealings with the 
same or different parties. 
12. Considerations of Practicality 
Facilitators. mediators. intermediaries. or other third-partvneutrals should 
attemot to ensure that decisions and agreements are implementable and that 
contingencies and future processes have been considered. Third-party 
neutrals should engage in "reality testing" to ensure decisions taken or 
agreements reached are implementable or realizable or that recommendations 
for future action may be referred to the appropriate legal or other authorities. 
223. Note that my fonnulation above does not demand neutrality because I believe that no 
human being is capable of being completely neutral. What is important is to act fairly and 
without bias toward the parties and participants. A mediator or facilitator may, in fact, have to 
take a non-neutral or punitive action if a party violates a procedure or engages in other 
misconduct; however, as long as the procedure is fair, such an action is completely proper and 
within the role of the third-party facilitator. See Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Walsh Pino, 
Neutrality: A Guide for the Organizational Ombudsperson, \3 NEGL. J. 17 (1997). An 
important controversy among mediators and facilitators involves when and how mediators 
should "intervene" to ensure fair outcomes and to protect the "unrepresented" parties. See 
Susskind, supra note 215, at 4-6. 
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Effective process experts should also assist the parties in developing plans for 
contingencies or uncertainties in agreements or decisions and provide for 
future deliberative or dispute-resolution processes. 
13. Following Decision Rules and the Law 
Agreements, decisions, and solutions should be approved according to the 
decision rules ofthe participants and consistent with applicable legal or other 
contextually based authorities. Agreements should be based on informed 
consent, not on coercion. A decision to not reach agreement should be a 
legitimate outcome if the conditions for reaching an agreement are not met. 
14. Respectful Awareness 
Facilitators, mediators, intermediaries, or other third-party neutrals should 
be sensitive to the different substantive, institutional, social, and cultural 
contexts in which they perform their duties. 
15. Avoiding Unjust or Unfair Results224 
A facilitator, mediator, intermediary, or other third-party neutral should 
do everything within his or her control to ensure that any agreement reached 
or decision taken is not unconscionable,m unfair, unjust, or causes 
unnecessary harm to the participants or to any third parties not present during 
the process. An effective consensus-building process should at least make the 
parties better off than they were before they began, perhaps emerging with 
little more than mutual understanding. However, a deliberative process 
should not be used to circumvent other legitimate laws or processes or to 
deflect harm onto unrepresented parties. Third-party neutrals should not 
preside over agreements that are obviously unfair, unjust, unconscionable, or 
that will harm the participants or others outside of the process. 
*** 
224. This last statement, or "core value," is "optional" because it is very controversial in 
the field of third-party neutrals and would impose a vague, but very demanding, standard of 
ethics and behavior. . 
225. This statement tracks the efforts to prohibit lawyers from negotiating and agreeing to 
"unconscionable" agreements in legal negotiations, which was originally proposed as Rule 4.3 
for the Kutak Commission; however, the proposed rule was soundly defeated. See BRUNET & 
CRAVER, supra note 134, at 174-75; Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in 
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 591 (1975) (positing the precept that "[t]he lawyer may not 
accept a result that is unconscionably unfair to the other party") (emphasis omitted); James J. 
White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. 1. 926 (1980). 
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The purpose of the preceding list of "core values" is to express some key 
ideas of good practices for both participants and expert "leaders" of 
consensus-building procedures. Such processes may be used in many settings, 
including public governmental, private individual, organizational, and 
international settings. A skilled "neutral" must become aware of and be 
respectful of how different settings and environments may require adaptation 
and modifications of the general principles. 
IV. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR LA WYERS AS CONSENSUS 
BUILDERS 
As the old Chinese proverb suggests, "we live in interesting times." 
Lawyers, as if they didn't have enough to do, now have the opportunity to 
expand their functions from traditional roles of advocate to facilitator, 
problem-solver, dispute resolver, and "neutral." For those lawyers who 
choose such new functions, whether as part of a traditional practice or as a 
different practice, there are many rewards and many challenges. For lawyers 
who continue to serve as advocates, the challenge will be to incorporate 
different paradigms or frameworks of work into the same human being.226 For 
lawyers who commit to a full-time practice offacilitation, mediation, dispute 
resolution, or consensus building, there will be collaboration and competition 
with others in the field who come from different disciplinary backgrounds. 
Whether it is possible to generate a core set of values, practices, and 
ethics from such a new interdisciplinary field that operates in so many 
different substantive environments remains to be seen. Already, some of us 
in the "founding generation" of this field lament the entrepreneurial turn that 
it appears to be taking. Many American professions, both old and new, face 
challenges to their core values and objectives, as demonstrated in the recent 
book, Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics Meet.227 Entrepreneurial and 
economic pressures, as well as increased demands for immediate success,228 
226. After many years of being a trial lawyer and teaching trial advocacy, I abandoned 
those roles when I became a more seriously committed mediator and mediation teacher. I found 
the roles of trial lawyer and mediator incompatible. See Jonathan Hyman, Trial Advocacy and 
Methods a/Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 
863,863-64 (1987). 
227. HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GooD WORK: WHEN EXCElLENCE AND Enncs MEET 
(2001) (contrasting the declining professional ethics and commitment of journalism to the 
"aligned" professionalism of geneticists). 
228. A recent effort to use a consensus-building process in the United States Congress 
resulted in a bipartisan statement about faith-based government initiatives. The effort was 
designed to demonstrate how a controversial issue, such as providing government subsidies for 
religious organizations that provide social services, could produce "recommendations" across 
party lines. See The Working Group on Human Needs and Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives, Finding Common Ground: 29 Recommendations o/the Working Group on Human 
Needs and Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (2002), available at www.working-
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often mute the animating values and goals of those who seek to develop a 
truly "alternative" professional framework. 
It is not clear whether the promulgation of ethics rules or codifications of 
the field facilitate professional identity in a positive waf29 or, in the 
alternative, blunt the opportunities for experimentation and cross-disciplinary 
collaboration. Ethics rules are often justified in terms of protecting the public. 
In conflict resolution, standards are necessary to assure consumers of these 
processes that what is being offered is fair (especially when compared to 
better known and mere conventional legal processes) and conducted by 
experienced professionals. Mediators, arbitrators, and facilitators need 
guidance in resolving difficult ethical dilemmas that they face.230 Lawyers, 
who are subject to discipline under the Model Rules for all work performed, 
even if it is not "the practice of law," may be harmed by the lack of clarity 
regarding their duties and responsibilities when they take on other roles. 
Despite the minimalist approach to ADR ethics in the revised Model Rules, 
state legislatures have passed full statutory schemes for the use of ADR231 and 
have proposed232 amending their ethical codes to better regulate the role of the 
lawyer as third-party neutral. Most of this activity focuses on the role of 
lawyers as arbitrators, mediators, or neutral evaluators. To the extent that 
lawyers now participate in new forms of conflict resolution and legal problem 
solving, such as policy formation and consensus building (where I think they 
should be especially useful as both "process architects" and as experts on 
substantive legal requirements), the ethical terrain is even more unmarked and 
unguided. Whether lawyers who do this work should be guided by what little 
there is in the interdisciplinary field already, or whether they should take the 
lead in suggesting analogues to conventional legal ethical norms and newer 
particularized standards of practice is a difficult question. 
The authors of Good Work pose an interesting question that we should 
consider: if you had a choice, what sort of problem would you work on for 
group.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002) (noting that the effort was facilitated by Consensus 
Council, Inc. and coordinated by Search For Common Ground, an organization that facilitates 
conflict resolution processes internationally and domestically and that promotes establishment 
of the U.S. Policy Consensus Commission, which would promote consensus-building processes 
at various levels of government action). 
229. A standard canon of organizational sociology requires that new professions use ethics 
codes to establish legitimacy and to prevent competition with other professions. See MAGALI 
SARFA TIl LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS S4 (1977); 
Andrew Abbott, Jurisdictional Conflicts: A New Approach to the Development of the Legal 
ProfeSSions, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 187,188 (1986). 
230. For a good definition of what an ethical "dilemma" is in dispute resolution, see 
ROBERT BARUCH BUSH, THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS AND POUCY IMPUCA TIONS (1992). 
231. See COLE ET AL, supra note 155; see also VA. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 2.10 
(2000) (listing the third-party neutral rule). 
232. See TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (effective Mar. 1,2003). 
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the next ten years of your professionallife?233 I have answered that question 
for myself by suggesting that lawyers can pursue "the central mission of the 
legal profession [in] the pursuit of justice, through the resolution of conflict 
or the orderly and civilized righting of wrongs"234 by striving for peace as "a 
prerequisite for justice, ,,23S and developing the skills and the ethical 
commitments to attempt to make social, legal, political, and economic 
problems more amenable to democratic, creative, and life-enhancing 
resolutions that include more active participation by more of the people 
affected by decisions made and actions taken. 
I believe that lawyers may play an important, but not exclusive, role in 
organizing and facilitating such democratic deliberation and negotiation to 
produce both better processes and better outcomes in the world. Clearly, we 
need new solutions to significant problems such as economic health and just 
distribution, health care, family responsibilities, corporate accountability, 
market productivity, resource allocation and environmental health, respectful 
treatment of a diverse citizenship, unemployment, and, not least of all, 
domestic and world peace. New skills are necessary for professions, such as 
law, to negotiate effectively with multiple parties, to lead and facilitate 
productive deliberations rather than simply making arguments to win, to 
imagine new and unused resolutions, and to work with contingent solutions 
to indeterminate problems as our "solution-oriented" science attempts to keep 
up with our changing knowledge base. 
Skillful management of the conflicts that human beings produce for 
themselves is indeed, as Stuart Hampshire says, one of the most important of 
human skills. It is also one of the most difficult skills to learn and teach 
because it is not a "single" skill, but a set of competencies, judgments, 
empathies, and other sensibilities that it may take a long time to teach and 
learn. I believe that these skills and sensibilities are central to our continued 
existence. I continue to believe, as both a teacher and an ethicist, that such 
skills may be learned and must be practiced responsibly and morally within 
that tension of what we can do for others and what we do for survival and self-
preservation or representation of others. By clarifying our purposes and 
aspirational values, by applying these aspirational principles to actual 
dilemmas of practice, and by committing ourselves to develop standards for 
responsible exercise of our various skills, we may not only make "new 
professions" (when our old and conventional ones fail to adapt adequately to 
change within honored traditions) that link several professional domains, but 
we can make the practice of our work both more individually fulfilling and 
social welfare enhancing. 
233. GARDNERET AL., supra note 227, at ix. 
234. Id. at 10. 
235. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-
First Century: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1761, 1765 (2002). 
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I hope that I have at least suggested some of the important issues and 
values that we should consider while we recognize the importance of this 
"new" work of the lawyer as dispute resolver, facilitator, and consensus 
builder. I have no doubt that lawyers who work as consensus builders, 
mediators, facilitators, and legal problem solvers will find that work fulfilling, 
as I have. Our legal ethical standards (as lawyers) do not provide useful 
beacons of light as we navigate in these new, but much needed, roles. We 
may only be at the discussion stage in our deliberations about new ethics for 
deliberators, so I hope I have at least spotted some issues and offered some 
useful ideas as we begin to try to develop some consensus about how lawyers 
might build more consensus in our conflict-ridden society. 
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APPENDIX 
Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (effective Mar. 1,2003) 
Rule 2.4: Lawyer as Dispute Resolution Neutral 
(a) A lawyer serves as a dispute resolution neutral when the lawyer impartially 
assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a 
resolution of disputes that have arisen between them. Service as a dispute 
resolution neutral may include service as a mediator; an arbitrator whose 
decision does not bind the parties; a case evaluator; a judge or juror in a mini-
trial or summary jury trial as described in Supreme Court Rule 31; or in such 
other capacity as will enable the lawyer to impartially assist the parties resolve 
their dispute. 
(b) A lawyer may serve as a dispute resolution neutral in a matter if: 
(1) the lawyer is competent to handle the matter; 
(2) the lawyer can handle the matter without undue delay; 
, 
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes he or she can be impartial as between the 
parties; 
(4) none of the parties to the dispute is being represented by the lawyer in 
other matters; 
(5) the lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral in the matter will not 
be adversely affected by the representation of clients with interests directly 
adverse to any of the parties to the dispute, by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
a client or a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests; 
(6) the lawyer consults with each of the parties to the dispute, or their 
attorneys, about the lawyer's qualifications and experience as a dispute 
resolution neutral, the rules and procedures that will be followed in the 
proceeding, and the lawyer's responsibilities as a dispute resolution neutral; 
provided, however, that any party to the dispute who is represented by a 
lawyer may waive his or her right to all or part of the consultation required by 
this paragraph; 
(7) the lawyer consults with each of the parties, or their lawyers, about any 
interests of the lawyer, the lawyer's clients, the clients of other lawyers with 
whom the lawyer is associated in a firm, or third persons that may materially 
affect the lawyer's impartiality in the matter; 
(8) unless the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, each of the 
parties, or their attorneys, consents in writing to the lawyer's service as a 
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dispute resolution neutral in the matter; and 
(9) when the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, the lawyer is 
qualified to serve in accordance with the requirements of that Rule. 
(c) While serving as a dispute resolution neutral, a lawyer shall: 
(1) act reasonably to assure that the parties understand the rules and 
procedures that will be followed in the proceeding and the lawyer's 
responsibilities as a dispute resolution neutral; 
(2) act impartially, competently, and expeditiously to assist the parties in 
resolving the matters in dispute; 
(3) promote mutual respect among the parties for the dispute resolution 
process; 
(4) as between the parties to the dispute and third persons, treat all 
information related to the dispute as if it were information protected by Rules 
1.6 and 1.8(b); 
(5) as between the parties to the dispute, treat all information obtained in an 
individual caucus with a party or a party's lawyer as if it were information 
related to the representation of a client protected by Rules 1.6 and 1. 8(b); 
(6) render no legal advice to any party to the dispute, but, if the lawyer 
believes that an unrepresented party does not understand how a proposed 
agreement might affect his or her legal rights or obligations, the lawyer shall 
advise that party to seek the advice of independent counsel; 
(7) accept nothing of value, other than fully disclosed reasonable 
compensation for services rendered as the dispute resolution neutral, from a 
party, a party's lawyer, or any other person involved or interested in the 
dispute resolution process; 
(8) not seek to coerce or unfairly influence a party to accept a proposal for 
resolution of a matter in dispute and shall not make any substantive decisions 
on behalf of a party; and 
(9) when the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, comply with all 
other duties of a dispute resolution neutral as set forth in that Rule. 
(d) A lawyer shall withdraw from service as a dispute resolution neutral or, 
if appointed by a court, shall seek the court's permission to withdraw from 
service as a dispute resolution neutral, if: 
(1) any of the parties so request; 
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(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that further dispute resolution services will 
not lead to an agreement resolving the matter in dispute or that any of the 
parties are unwilling or unable to cooperate with the lawyer's dispute 
resolution initiatives; or 
(3) any of the conditions stated in paragraph (b) are no longer satisfied. 
( e) Upon termination of a lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral, the 
lawyer: 
(1) may, with the consent of all the parties to the dispute and in compliance 
with the requirements of Rules 1.2(c) and 2.2, draft a settlement agreement 
that results from the dispute resolution process, but shall not otherwise 
represent any or all of the parties in connection with the matter, and 
(2) shall afford each party to the dispute the protections afforded a client by 
Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), and 1.9. 
Comments 
[1] Mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
have been in use for many years, but increasing demands in recent years for 
more prompt and efficient means of resolving disputes of all kinds have led 
to an increase in the demand for the services of dispute resolution neutrals 
skilled in the analysis of disputes and in conflict resolution. Lawyers are 
often particularly well-suited to perform this role and should be encouraged 
to do so. 
[2] Although service as a dispute resolution neutral is considered a law-related 
service governed generally by these Rules, see RPC 5.7, the unique nature of 
a lawyer's role when serving as a dispute resolution neutral demands separate, 
more specific, treatment in this Rule for the guidance ofthe profession and the 
public. 
[3] This Rule provides that a lawyer may serve as a dispute resolution neutral, 
whether as a mediator, a non-binding arbitrator, a case evaluator, or a judge 
or juror in a mini-trial or summary jury trial. The scope ofa lawyer's possible 
service as a neutral is intended to be generally the same as that adopted in' 
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 governing court-annexed alternative 
dispute resolution. However, although Rule 31 covers only court-annexed 
alternative dispute resolution, this Rule covers services as a dispute resolution 
neutral whether rendered in connection with court-annexed dispute resolution 
proceedings or in another, perhaps wholly private, context not covered by 
Rule 31. 
[4] This Rule does not cover the rendering by a lawyer of services related to 
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alternative dispute resolution that are not neutral in nature, but are more 
judicial in nature, such as service as an arbitrator in a binding arbitration. 
Although Rule 5.7 may address a lawyer's obligations in such a context, this 
Rule does not purport to address them. 
[5] Although a lawyer who serves as a dispute resolution neutral is subject to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, see RPC 5.7, many of the Rules do not 
directly apply to such service because the participants in a dispute resolution 
proceeding are not the lawyer's clients. Other Rules do apply, however, and 
this Rule further provides specific applications of certain rules that must apply 
differently in this context (including, for example, the application of rules 
governing conflicts of interest). 
[6] Although the requirements of this Rule are generally intended to be 
consistent with those imposed on dispute resolution neutrals under Rule 31, 
there are duties additional to those set out in Rule 31 that are imposed on 
lawyers who serve in this role. See also Supreme Court Rule 31, Appendix: 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Rule 31 Mediators. Even though 
nonlawyers certified by the Supreme Court under Rule 31 as dispute 
resolution neutrals may not be subject to these Rules and the parties to the 
dispute are not deemed to be the clients of the lawyer serving as their dispute 
resolution neutral, the parties are properly entitled to assume that lawyers 
serving in this capacity are largely subject to the same broad standards of 
conduct as are applicable to lawyers when they are providing legal services 
to clients. 
[7] The Supreme Court has set forth in Rule 31 rules and standards of 
professional conduct applicable to all Rule 31 neutrals, including lawyers and 
nonlawyers. Thus, paragraph (b) contemplates that a lawyer may serve as a 
Rule 31 neutral if the lawyer complies with these requirements. Paragraph 
(b )(9) further requires that a lawyer serving as a dispute resolution neutral 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31 must comply fully with the requirements 
of that Rule as well. 
[8] Paragraph (b) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer may serve 
parties to a dispute as a dispute resolution neutral. With respect to the parties 
to the dispute, Rule 1.7 is inapplicable because there is no client-lawyer 
relationship between the neutral and the parties to the dispute. Rule 1.7 
remains applicable, however, to protect a client, as distinct from parties the 
lawyer is serving as a neutral, if the lawyer's service as a neutral will 
materially limit the lawyer's representation of that client. Similarly, if the 
lawyer's service as a neutral would be materially adverse to one of the 
lawyer's former clients, and the matters are substantially related, the lawyer 
must afford the former client the protection of Rule 1.9. 
[9] Conflicts of interest for lawyers serving as dispute resolution neutrals are 
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specifically addressed because the parties to a dispute resolution proceeding 
are not the clients of the dispute resolution neutral. The lawyer serving as 
neutral, however, must be impartial, must fully disclose any pertinent 
relationships to the parties to the proceeding, and must obtain their consent to 
the lawyer's service based on these disclosures. Paragraph (b)(4) does not 
provide for mandatory vicarious disqualification based on a lawyer's current 
or prospective service as a dispute resolution neutral. If, however, a lawyer 
asked to serve as a neutral has a partner who currently represents one of the 
parties to the dispute in other matters, the lawyer obviously would be required 
to disclose this fact to the parties under (b )(7) and obtain consent to service 
as a neutral. Of course, this lawyer must also possess a reasonable belief that 
impartiality was possible despite this and other such pertinent relationships. 
If a lawyer may not make the disclosures required by paragraph (b )(7) because 
of his confidentiality obligations to a client, then the lawyer may not serve as 
a dispute neutral. 
[10] Paragraph (c) further provides various standards of conduct particular to 
service by a lawyer as a dispute resolution neutral. Again, these rules of 
conduct are intended to be consistent with Rule 31 and to address the 
particular situation of a neutral who occupies a significantly different 
relationship to participants in a dispute resolution proceeding than a lawyer 
does with clients. Paragraphs (c)(4) and (c)(5) treat the confidentiality of all 
information related to the dispute (including that obtained in individual 
caucuses with the parties) by analogy to the rules concerning the 
confidentiality of client information. Thus, for example, any question 
concerning the potential disclosure of fraud by a participant in a dispute 
resolution proceeding would be addressed under Rules 1.6, 3.3, or 4.1 as 
though the participant were, in fact, a client of the lawyer. Other portions of 
paragraph (c), such as the ban on undisclosed compensation by one of the 
participants in paragraph (c )(7), the prohibition on coercion or decision 
making on behalf of parties in paragraph (c )(8), and the ban on giving legal 
advice to the participants in paragraph (c)(6), impose restrictions needed to 
insure and reinforce the necessary impartiality of the lawyer serving as a 
dispute resolution neutral. 
[11] Paragraph (d) requires that a lawyer serving as a dispute resolution 
neutral withdraw or seek an appointing court's permission to withdraw in 
certain specified circumstances, such as a request by a party to do so or the 
lawyer's reasonable belief that the lawyer's service will not be fruitful. 
[12] Paragraph (e) establishes a lawyer's duties toward participants in a 
dispute resolution proceeding upon the termination of the lawyer's service as 
a neutral for any reason, whether because a settlement is achieved or because 
a party requests the lawyer's withdrawal. Given the impartial role of a dispute 
resolution neutral, it is inappropriate for a lawyer who had served as a dispute 
resolution neutral to later represent any of the parties to the dispute in 
HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 119 2002-2003
2002] THE LA WYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER 119 
connection with the subject matter of that dispute resolution proceeding. This 
disqualification, however, does not extend to other lawyers associated in a law 
firm with the dispute resolution neutral. If, however, the parties have 
successfully resolved their dispute, paragraph (e)(I) permits the lawyer-
neutral to draft the agreement settling their dispute, but this must be done in 
conformity with Rules 1.2(c) and 2.2. 
[13] Further, paragraph (e)(2) provides that, even though the participants to 
a concluded dispute resolution proceeding were not the clients of the lawyer 
who served as a dispute resolution neutral in that proceeding, these 
participants are nevertheless entitled to the protections relating to 
confidentiality and conflicts of interest afforded by Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), and 1.9 
as if they were former clients. 
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